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Directors of U.S. public firms have historically been paid for their 
directorship exclusively by the company in which they serve.  Recently, 
however, activist investors have asked shareholders to elect director-
candidates who received a lucrative compensation package from the 
activist in addition to their compensation arrangement with the company.  
Incumbent managers and their defenders, such as Wachtell, have sharply 
condemned this practice, terming it a ‘golden leash’ that subjects the 
nominated director to the activist’s control.  In this Article, I explain why 
these critics are mistaken.  Activist-paid directors can be expected to 
improve corporate performance at poorly performing firms, and the cost of 
such arrangements, if any, is likely to be much lower than that of similar 
arrangements that are already widely used throughout corporate America 
and are welcomed by these critics. 
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INTRODUCTION:  
THE FEIGNED HYSTERIA AROUND ACTIVIST-PAID DIRECTORS 
Director compensation in the U.S. could be perceived as a relatively 
mundane and uneventful topic.  Directors are most often elected without 
challenge, based on the company’s recommendation.  They serve, at least 
in theory, all shareholders and owe their duties to the corporation.  They 
most often control their own tenure, deciding when to retire.  In each 
company, directors are compensated equally regardless of their affiliation, 
credentials or tenure.1  This parity has been lauded as a crucial element in 
promoting board ‘cohesiveness’ and teamwork to the benefit of all 
shareholders. 
Now, imagine a world in which directors receive compensation for 
their work not only from the company in which they serve, but also from 
other interested parties.  Imagine a world in which directors might not have 
such a tight grip on their seats.  Imagine a world where an activist hedge 
fund, whose motives are not clear, entices candidates for board positions by 
offering them large sums of cash or equity, potentially up to an additional 
$1 million over a few years, if they fulfill certain thresholds that are set up 
by the hedge fund and not by the company or the general shareholder base.  
Imagine a world in which several nominees of a hedge fund gain seats on 
the board of a target company, having these side-payment deals in place, 
with the activist that nominated them to the position.  Imagine a board that 
is fragmented, and may hold loyalty to multiple masters. 
What would you think of that world? Should we allow for 
differentiation between board members’ compensation?  Are we 
comfortable with allowing specific shareholders to set goals for some board 
members without the intermediation of the company or the shareholder 
base as a whole?  Your gut reaction might be: there is something wrong 
with such a world.  It just doesn’t feel right to have directors hold loyalty 
and interests to both the company and a specific shareholder.  You might 
be concerned that fractioning the board would entail too high of a cost.  
 
 1.  With some slight differentiation based on specific committee service and the 
position of chairman, see infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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Let’s just leave things be, you would advocate.  Mundane is good, you 
could argue. 
Well, this imaginary world is not imaginary any longer. Over the past 
six years there have been several attempts by hedge fund activists to 
nominate candidates that had agreements for side-payments with the 
activist fund.  In November 2014, these attempts finally culminated in a 
first case of appointment, through negotiated agreement, of board members 
who were nominated by an activist hedge fund and who are paid, in 
addition to their board compensation, with up to four payments of $250,000 
based on the company and the activist success. 
The emergence of activist-paid nominees was met with strong 
reactions.  Companies and their lawyers raised concerns regarding the 
independence of the nominees, coining the term ‘golden leash’ with respect 
to these compensation structures.2  Concerns regarding board cohesiveness, 
motivation and loyalty of these directors mounted3 and some prominent 
academics were very critical of these arrangements, commenting that, “[i]f 
this nonsense is not illegal, it ought to be[,]”4 that “third-party bonuses 
create the wrong incentives, fragment the board and imply a shift toward 
both the short-term and higher risk[,]” and that the “end does not justify the 
means.”5 
But is this new, non-imaginary world really so concerning?  Should it 
be?  Is the hysteria over these payments truly justified?  This Article strives 
 
 2.  See Janet Mcfarland, Jana’s Agrium Pay Scheme Draws Fire, THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL (Toronto), (Mar. 04, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/janas-
agrium-pay-scheme-draws-fire/article9256064/ [perma.cc/3CPE-CD4N] (“‘This kind of 
‘golden leash’ arrangement is unheard of in Canada and raises serious questions about the 
independence of Jana’s nominees and their ability to act in the best interests of all 
shareholders,’ Mr. Zaleschuk said in a letter to Agrium shareholders. . . .”). 
 3.  See David Benoit, Bank Directors Get Nod Amid Criticism on Pay Stance, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 29, 2013, at C3, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304017204579224200100433792 [perma.cc/5Q8A-UJTW] (revealing 
widespread criticism of Provident directors because of their support for bylaw amendments 
that would bar nominees from getting paid by activist investors who support them). 
 4.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Can Corporate Directors Take Third Party Pay From 
Hedge Funds? (Apr. 08, 2013, 09:51 PM), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2013/04/can-corporate-
directors-take-third-party-pay-from-hedge-funds.html [perma.cc/C7YQ-9FEP]. 
 5.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholder Activism and Ethics: Are Shareholder Bonuses 
Incentives or Bribes? THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/04/29/shareholder-activism-and-ethics-are-
shareholder-bonuses-incentives-or-bribes/ [perma.cc/F22T-RJ7Z]; see also Martin Lipton, 
ISS Addresses Dissident Director Compensation Bylaw, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/21/iss-addresses-dissident-director-
compensation-bylaw/ [perma.cc/P652-YNAD] (noting a recent ISS recommendation that 
shareholders of small cap bank withhold their votes from director candidates). 
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to debunk some of the underlying assumptions that fuel this hysteria over 
third-party compensation arrangements to directors and by taking a more 
nuanced, case based approach to the topic by suggesting several 
demarcating lines that could prove useful in examining each of the specific 
compensation arrangements in question. 
Specifically, this Article argues that the aforementioned mundane 
world of the board never really existed—that directors have always been 
appointed by and held allegiance to third parties and interested 
shareholders, even before this latest surge in activism; and that directors’ 
interests and equity stakes in the company inherently vary, with or without 
activist presence.  As such, the world of a united, cohesive board, a board 
that earns the same pay and is comprised of appointees of the company as a 
whole, never truly or fully existed.  Against this more accurate portrait of 
the world, the outcry of companies and academics against the introduction 
of activist-paid nominees fails to acknowledge the already embedded 
complexity of boards’ financial and non-monetary interests, while 
simultaneously ignoring the significant potential benefits the introduction 
of activist-paid directors to corporate boards might entail. 
This Article continues as follows: Part II details the backdrop against 
which supplemental pay to directors has emerged and provides more 
detailed information regarding this new pay structure and the objections to 
it.  Part III provides important, but yet often overlooked, data regarding 
director pay.  Part IV presents the benefits activist-paid directors might 
provide, both to the activist themselves and to shareholders as a whole.  
Part V responds to the main arguments against such pay practice while Part 
VI strives to provide some rudimentary bright-line guidelines that could 
help in building a framework that examines such pay practices on their 
merits, ad-hoc, and does not exclude them altogether.  Part VII then 
concludes. 
I. THE RISE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND THE 
CONTROVERSY OVER ACTIVIST-PAID DIRECTORS 
A. The Rise of Shareholder Activism 
1. The Origins of Shareholder Activism 
Activist investors, hedge funds and private equity firms have been 
playing an increasingly important, and active, role in corporate America.  
Their participation, alongside other changes to the corporate landscape,6 
 
 6.  Among the recent changes are the SEC proxy reform, the establishment of the say 
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has created a surge in the activism movement in the U.S.7  Prior to the 
emergence of these new institutional investors, it was hoped that traditional 
institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, would act 
as shareholders’ safeguards.  In reality, however, their involvement was 
barely noticed.  Most traditional institutions were limited in the amount of 
equity stake they could hold in a single corporation and in the composition 
of their financial compensation structure.8  The traditional institutions 
suffered from conflicts of interest and political influence9 that prevented or 
 
on pay as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, the regulation of some private funds, etc.  For a 
review of these changes, see, e.g., Tod Perry & Randle B. Pollard, “Grade Incomplete”: 
Examining the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Attempt to Implement Credit Rating 
and Certain Corporate Governance Reforms of Dodd-Frank, 41 U. IND. L. REV. 147, 157 
(2014) (discussing the changes made by the SEC to proxy access, Say on Pay, and several 
other regulations as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. 
Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, in CORP. GOVERNANCE 325, 329 
(Boubaker et al. eds., Springer 2012) (highlighting the debate regarding whether increasing 
shareholder activism is part of the problem or the solution); Aviv Pichhadze, Is the SEC A 
Learning Regulator? Lessons From Proxy Access, REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 3 (2013) 
(suggesting an increase of layering - regulatory systems characterized by competing logics, 
thereby creating inherent tensions - in the post-Crisis U.S.). 
 7.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 
675, 688–89 (2007) (discussing impediments to replacing boards even when shareholder 
dissatisfaction is high); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2007) (noting how 
hedge fund have become critical players in corporate governance and control); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 
1087 (June 2015) (highlighting the recent increase in shareholder activism, creating a debate 
as to whether such activism is more beneficial or harmful). 
 8.  The fee structure used by traditional institutions has a direct influence on their 
activism as it is correlated with their size, not with their performance.  New institutions use 
an incentivized fee structure, commonly called 2/20, which gives them 20% of the portfolio 
upside (without sharing the downside) and a 2% management fee, which induces them to 
invest funds in improving governance.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The SEC and The 
Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 903 (1994) 
(discussing the differences between traditional funds’ incentive fee structures and newer 
venture capitalist, private equity, and hedge fund incentive fee structures); Bernard S. Black, 
Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. AND L.  459 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (generally defining 
the state of shareholder activism in the U.S.). 
 9.  See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799-831 (1993) (explaining the conflict of interest 
public pension funds face as investors, balancing political pressure and the interests of fund 
beneficiaries); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 520, 570-75 (1990) (noting the rise of shareholder activism); Diane Del Guercio & 
Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 
293, 294 (1999) (discussing the argument whether political pressure on public pension funds 
motivates activism, and that such pressure conflicts with the interests of fund beneficiaries); 
Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder 
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 279-80 (2000) 
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decreased their level of activism,10 and these factors reduced their 
incentives to invest in improving governance.11 
Hedge funds and private equity funds, on the other hand, are free from 
these regulatory limitations:12  they are not limited in the amount of equity 
they can acquire in one corporation; they have incentive-based fee 
structures;13 and they are not bound by political or business constraints.14  
The fee structure of hedge funds and other less regulated financial 
institutions, coupled with their tendency to magnify their equity stake by 
using sophisticated derivatives,15 has induced some of them to take an 
active role in the governance of U.S. public firms.  Most often, these funds 
get involved through a public call for change, request for board 
representation, threatening their portfolio companies with a proxy fight, 
and sometimes launching one.16  In their efforts to exert influence, hedge 
funds have also used legal remedies, such as requests for injunctions 
against management proposals and for public declarations of intentions.17 
 
(investigating the role of activist institutional investors, which arose due to the conflict of 
interest between management and shareholders); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Corporate 
Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 
(1996) (discussing the role of activist institutional investors to pressure management and 
align management’s incentives with those of shareholders). 
 10.  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1048 (exploring factors that decrease 
activism).  
 11.  Direct regulation and tax regulation prevented institutions from holding large 
stakes in a single corporation.  See Mark Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate 
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 17-30 (1991) (discussing the effects of regulations on 
various institutions’ ability to invest). 
 12.  For an explanation of why hedge funds are not subject to the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, see William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1375, 1382 n.33 (2006).  For information about the various types of hedge fund investment 
strategies, see René Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present and Future, 21 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 
175, 182 (2007).  For a discussion of the current state of limited private equity regulations, 
see Brian Cheffins & John Armour, Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 55-59 
(2008). 
 13.  See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text (describing the fee structure of 
funds as based on size, not performance).  
 14.  See supra note 12 (describing why funds operate with little regulation). 
 15.  Hedge funds tend to use the derivatives market much more commonly and 
aggressively than other institutions.  Thus, a hedge fund can increase its equity interest in a 
corporation just by buying derivative assets (as put or call options), thereby amplifying its 
economic interest without needing to increase its actual shareholdings in the firm.  See 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1062 (noting that 15% of hedge funds use leverage at a ratio 
in excess of two and that 35% to 55% use leverage at lower ratios). 
 16.  See Bratton, supra note 12, at 1402-03 (explaining how hedge funds pursue activist 
agendas against target companies). 
 17.  See the legal challenge against Apple’s attempt to bundle several topics under one 
management resolution and the motive of the activist hedge fund to force a public 
discussion over the payout policy of the company.  While the suit was aimed at Apple’s 
ARTICLE 5_NILI 2-15.DOCX 5 (NILI) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:47 PM 
516 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
And while the traditional institutional investors have failed to lead the 
way, the increasing involvement of these new institutions and the 
emergence of proxy advisory firms have also stimulated the activism 
conducted by the traditional institutions, leading to an overall increase in 
the number of shareholders willing to take an active role in the governance 
of the corporation.18 
This surge in activism, coupled with the attention it merits, has 
propelled activism from a localized occurrence into a matter that dominates 
both the business arena and corporate governance scholarly discourse.  
Indeed, activist investors have been lauding this new landscape, with Carl 
Icahn, one of the most prominent and long-tenured activist investors, 
stating that “there has never been a better time . . . for activist investing.”19  
Similar sentiments can be found in the statement by Mark Mobius, the 
executive chairman of Templeton Emerging Markets Group that 
“shareholder activism is not a privilege–it is a right and a responsibility. . . .  
If we believe there is something going wrong with the company, then we, 
as shareholders, must become active and vocal.”20 
 
bundling of several matters under one management proposal, the underlying motive 
involved Apple’s overall dividend policy and the large amount of cash Apple was hoarding.  
See Jennifer Ablan & Poomima Gupta, Einhorn Sues Apple, Marks Biggest Investor 
Challenge in Years, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2013, 10:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
apple-greenlight-idUSBRE9160MI20130208 [perma.cc/8MGZ-RKP3] (discussing an 
activist suit against Apple to issue preferred stock with increased dividend payments); see 
also William Alden, Einhorn’s Apple Suit Fits a History of Public Calls, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Feb. 7, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/taking-on-
apple-einhorn-has-a-history-of-public-calls/ [perma.cc/C848-8KT7](discussing several of 
the suits activist investor David Einhorn has pursued against different companies). 
 18.  See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the 
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315 
(2008) (documenting the developing role of public pension funds in corporate governance); 
David Gelles & Michael J. de la Merced, New Alliances in Battle for Corporate Control, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 18, 2014, 9:40 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/new-alliances-in-battle-for-corporate-
control/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [perma.cc/2AM3-6JA9 ] (describing the shift in the 
struggle for corporate control toward activist investors); Matteo Tonello, Global Trends in 
Board-Shareholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. 
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/25/global-trends-in-board-
shareholder-engagement/ [perma.cc/R4RK-D6FT] (summarizing the current state of 
increased shareholder engagement and advocating for directors’ response to shareholder 
concerns). 
 19.  Sam Forgione, Carl Icahn Says No Better Time to Be an Activist Investor, REUTERS 
(Nov. 4, 2013, 5:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/us-icahnenterprises-
results-idUSBRE9A312F20131104 [perma.cc/LD7S-4YY3 ] (quoting the 2013 third quarter 
report of Carl Ichan’s activist investment vehicle, Ichan Enterprises L.P.). 
 20.  Mark Mobius, Knowing Your Shareholder Rights, INVESTMENT ADVENTURES IN 
EMERGING MARKETS (Apr. 2, 2010), 
http://mobius.blog.franklintempleton.com/2010/04/02/knowing-your-shareholder-rights/ 
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This golden age of activism is reflected not only in the amount and 
success rates of activist campaigns,21 or in the sentiment of activist 
investors themselves.  The SEC chair, Mary Jo White, has touted the 
benefits of shareholder activism22 joining a vast literature that has been 
supporting the shareholder franchise and calling for more shareholder 
involvement in corporate life.23  In turn, companies, practitioners and others 
have raised concerns regarding the benefits of activism and the intentions 
of shareholders, leading to a highly charged debate on the merits of 
increased shareholder activism in the governance of widely held 
corporations.24 
 
[perma.cc/3SVG-LXB4] (detailing an example of successful minority shareholder activism 
with a large international manufacturing company).  
 21.  See infra note 101 and accompanying text (describing the rise in success rates of 
proxy fights); see also Contested U.S. Elections, Mergers in 2013, ISS GOVERNANCE 
WEEKLY (Sept. 13, 2013) (stating that the resurgence of contested board elections, which 
began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season); John J. Madden, The Evolving 
Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard
.edu/corpgov/2013/12/23/the-evolving-direction-and-increasing-influence-of-shareholder-
activism/ [perma.cc/E5CK-PK9U] (“According to ISS, . . . [p]roxy contests to replace some 
or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 
and 24 in the first half of 2013.  And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 
43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013. . . .  [D]ata from Sharkrepellent for 2013 through mid-
September shows similar dissident success.  For that period, Sharkrepellent reports 37 
contests filed and 23 going to a shareholder vote; with a dissident win rate of 65%.”); 
SharkRepellent.net, The Proxy Fight for Board Seats Trend Analysis Report, (Sept. 17, 
2013) (on file with author) (listing proxy fights from January 2013 to May 2013). 
 22.  See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Chair White Touts Benefits of Shareholder Activism, 
REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/us-sec-shareholder-
activism-idUSBRE9B20TC20131203 [perma.cc/9P5S-VWBA] (reporting on SEC Chair 
Mary Jo White’s speech at a conference organized by the European Corporate Governance 
Institute on the use of shareholder activism as a tool to foster communication between 
management, boards, and shareholders). 
 23.  The main proponent of this movement is Professor Bebchuk.  See, e.g., Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 835, 836 (2005) 
(analyzing empirical evidence to suggest an alternative regime of increased shareholder 
power to improve corporate governance arrangements); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting 
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784-85 (2006) (arguing that 
shareholder power, even with its shortcomings, would improve corporate governance 
arrangements); Bebchuck, supra note 7, at 676 (arguing that current shareholder powers are 
insufficient to make boards accountable). 
 24.  See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, at 1089 (conducting a systematic empirical 
investigation to refute myopic-activists claims); see also Martin Lipton & William Savitt, 
The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 734 (2007) (criticizing Bebchuk’s 
calls for shareholder reform as radical, shifting power to shareholders at the expense of 
managers and directors).  One of the main concerns is about the use of activism for short-
term self-interest over the long-term efficiency of the firm.  This is balanced against the risk 
of potentially leading to over-activism that will distort daily life at the firm and harm the 
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2. The Beneficial Effects of Shareholder Activism 
While early academic writing has focused on the general theoretical 
benefits of shareholder involvement in corporate affairs,25 recent studies 
have provided more concrete evidence regarding the benefits of activism.  
Numerous studies in the last few years have demonstrated that activists are 
adding value to their target corporations via multiple channels and that such 
value creation, despite some critics’ contentions, is not only in short-term 
but that it is sustained for the long-term.26  Indeed, studies have found 
activists to be adding value to target companies by engaging in tax 
planning and structure;27 improving corporate governance;28 reducing 
 
board and management’s ability to steer the corporation effectively.  See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, 
THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC, 63–73 (2012) (summarizing the divergence of interest 
between long-term and short-term investors); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Responses: Director 
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744–51 (2006) 
(explaining why limited shareholder voting rights is the default in corporate law); William 
W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 653, 653–54, 657–59 (2010) (countering the argument that shareholder 
empowerment will reduce management agency costs); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What 
Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, at 49, 51 (discussing problems 
created by increase in shareholder power and rise of short-term investors).  Similar concerns 
were raised regarding hedge funds’ use of derivatives to manipulate other shareholders.  
See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815-16 (2006) (expressing 
concern that the rise of hedge funds and shareholder activism will encourage the separation 
of voting rights and ownership of shares); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, supra note 7, 
at 1070-72 (discussing concerns related to hedge fund activism).  Recent research has cast 
some doubt on the empirical validity of these concerns.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The 
Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1667 
(2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk 2013] (noting the lack of empirical support of insulation 
advocates’ claim that activist interventions lead to long term losses); Lucian A. Bebchuk et 
al., supra note 7, at 1101-35 (providing empirical evidence regarding the positive effects 
hedge funds have on firm performance in the long term); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-
Termism – In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 1005 (2013) 
(concluding from a system-wide analysis that further judicial isolation of boards from 
markets is untenable); and Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term 
Shareholders Forthcoming, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1557 (2015) (questioning the benefit of 
giving long-term shareholders more power over public companies). 
 25.  See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 679 (arguing in theory that the power to run a 
company is vested in the board of directors as an agent of shareholders, and not in 
management). 
 26.  See Bebchuk 2013, supra note 24, at 1663 (arguing that activists have incentives to 
seek actions with both short-term and long-term payoffs). 
 27.  See C. S. Agnes Cheng et al., The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax 
Avoidance, 87 ACCT. REV. 1493, 1495 (2012) (observing that businesses exhibit lower tax 
avoidance levels prior to hedge fund activism, but higher levels post-intervention). 
 28.  See Vicente Cuñat et al., The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on 
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managerial entrenchment and shareholder passivity;29 increasing short-term 
returns and long term value creation in share value; introducing 
operational, financial, and governance improvements to enhance corporate 
efficiency;30 and properly allocating resources to corporate innovation31 and 
CEO pay.32 
Importantly, these benefits have positive spillover effects. While 
activist intervention is at times necessary, the mere threat of activist 
intervention can induce managers of other public companies to take steps to 
generate value for shareholders in order to prevent activists from targeting 
their companies in the first place.33  Thus, the increased credibility of the 
 
Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943, 1944 (2012) (providing a causal estimate that passing a 
governance proposal increases shareholder value). 
 29.  See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1907, 1910 (2013) (arguing that shareholder concentration and activism, among 
other things, shifted the U.S. system from manager-centric system to a shareholder-centric 
system); see also, Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 
94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2014) (arguing that corporate governance politics are more 
symbolic than reflective of reality). 
 30.  See Bebchuk 2013, supra note 24, at 1663 (discussing positive long-term payoffs 
activists could bring such as replacing an incompetent CEO); Marco Becht, et al. Returns to 
Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 23 
REV. FIN. STUD. 3093, 3097 (2010) (reporting the success of the Hermes UK Focus Fund’s 
unique form of activism in generating returns for its investors); Alon Brav et al., The Real 
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market Competition (U.S. 
Census Bureau: Ctr. for Econ. Stud. Paper, Nov. 17, 2011) at 2 (finding that companies in 
competitive industries experience an improvement in production efficiency after hedge fund 
activism); Shane Goodwin, Myopic Investor Myth Debunked: The Long-Term Efficacy of 
Hedge Fund Activism in the Boardroom, (June 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), at 7, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2450214 [perma.cc/4NRF-M4MQ] (finding that hedge 
funds generate long-term value for shareholders of target firms). 
 31.  See Alon Brav et al., Shareholder Power and Corporate Innovation: Evidence from 
Hedge Fund Activism (Kelly Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2014-05, 2014), at 3-4, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2409404 [perma.cc/6GZN-KAXU] (finding an 
improvement in innovation efficiency for firms targeted by hedge funds); Zhongzhi He et 
al., Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Innovation (Mar. 19, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), at 31-32, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411739 [perma.cc/V9YD-
C8MA] (finding that both innovative and non-innovative firms have the same likelihood of 
being targeted by activist hedge funds, which subsequently enhance innovative activities). 
 32.  See Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 
535, 576 (2010) (finding empirical evidence supporting an advisory “say on pay” vote). 
 33.  For literature discussing the ex-ante benefits of activism, see, for example, Heqing 
Zhu, The Preventive Effect of Hedge Fund Activism (Nov. 1, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), at 6-8, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2369533 [perma.cc/ZE7T-4HGL] 
(examining the effectiveness of hedge fund activism in increasing shareholder distribution 
and decreasing CEO pay); Nickolay Gantchev et al., Governance under the Gun: Spillover 
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (Jan. 13, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), at 2, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2356544 [perma.cc/BBN7-SE9Y] (investigating manager 
perception of activism as a threat and resulting policy changes); April Klein & Emanuel 
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option for activism, might serve as an effective disciplinary force, 
improving firm performance, even without actual activist involvement. 
And indeed, activist campaigns have not only garnered attention but 
also generated many recent success stories.  For example: 
Activist investors led to new management being brought in at 
Yahoo, whose share price has since doubled, and encouraged the 
departure of Steve Ballmer from Microsoft, whose share price is 
higher than at any time since the dotcom bubble burst.  Mr[.] 
Icahn forced Apple to hand back to investors some of its $160 
billion cash pile.  Even Tim Cook, [Apple’s CEO], now admits 
that the firm does not have enough decent investment 
opportunities to absorb it.34 
Similar successful campaigns were conducted by the Clinton Group 
winning a majority of seats on the board of Stillwater Mining,35 Starboard 
 
Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s Existing Bondholders, 24 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1735, 1735-37 (2011) (finding that hedge fund activism reduces 
bondholders’ wealth); Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, at 1103-06 (providing empirical 
evidence regarding the positive effects hedge funds have on firm performance in the long 
term); Hadiye Aslan & Praveen Kumar, The Product Market Effects of Shareholder 
Activism, 2014 J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2015), at 3-5, https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?paper_id=311&db_name=AFA2015 [perma.cc/HQS7-3LV5] 
(finding that activism grows target firms’ market shares and improves price-cost markups); 
Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An 
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. LAW 681, 723 (2007) (finding that hedge funds are 
pressuring managements to develop better practices); Christopher P. Clifford, Value 
Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323, 324 
(2008) (examining hedge funds’ organizational structures and finding that activism results 
in positive wealth creation in target firms). 
 34.  Corporate Upgraders, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2014, at 10.  See also Nathan Vardi, 
ValueAct Hedge Fund’s Huge Microsoft Victory, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/09/03/valueact-hedge-funds-huge-microsoft-
victory/ [perma.cc/WTZ5-EADQ] (illustrating the growing power of activist investors 
through ValueAct’s gaining a seat on Microsoft’s board with only a 0.8% stake); Sruthi 
Ramakrishnan & Edwin Chan, Apple’s New Finance Steward Maestri Takes Over $160 
Billion Cash Haul, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2014, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-apple-cfo-idUSBREA2315T20140304 
[perma.cc/UB76-MBXH] (describing Apple’s $160 billion free cash problem); Michael J. 
de la Merced, Icahn Ends Call for Apple Stock Buyback, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 10, 
2014, 10:19 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/icahn-backs-off-apple-buyback-
proposal/ [perma.cc/XR82-LGQD] (reporting Apple’s repurchases of shares in spite of Carl 
Icahn’s withdrawal of his proposal); Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple Ramps up Stock 
Buybacks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2014, at B1, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303496804579367543198542118 [perma.cc/8H4N-QF6G] (reporting 
Carl Icahn’s proposal for Apple to buy back an additional $50 billion of its own shares). 
 35. See The Activist Investing Annual Review 2014, ACTIVIST INSIGHT, 2014, at 17, 
http://www.srz.com/The_Activist_Investing_Annual_Review_2014/ [perma.cc/RG4Y-
2SGF] [hereinafter Activist Investing Review] (reviewing the growth in importance of 
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Value LP successfully overseeing a merger of Office Depot with Office 
Max and winning board representation,36 Elliott winning board seats at 
Emulex and striking a deal that secured a share repurchase program,37 and 
Pershing Square Capital Management winning a proxy fight to turn around 
Canadian Pacific Railway.38 
All of the above highlights not only why activism has taken center-
stage in public, business, and academic discourse, but also the important, 
and positive, role that activism serves in improving corporate performance.  
This realization is especially important since, as furthered elaborated 
below, if activism is on balance positive, then as a policy matter it should 
be facilitated and not restricted. 
B. The Controversy 
1. The Importance of Board Representation as an Activist’s Tool 
While activists differ in their internal structure, focus, and turnaround 
goals, an important part of any activist playbook is getting one or more 
seats on a target company’s board.  While getting a ‘seat at the table’ does 
not allow an activist to necessarily control the board, as the activist may 
desire in some cases, it does provide enough ‘voice’ to make sure that the 
ideas and vision the activist has for the company get a fair hearing in the 
boardroom.  Sometimes, the activists themselves get board seats; in other 
instances, they nominate an independent director who is not employed by 
the activist, usually an industry expert who has expertise and an interest in 
 
activist investors at Stillwater Mining Company, where activism resulted in winning four 
board seats and removal of both CEO and Chairman). 
 36. See id. at 14 (reporting Starboard Value’s 2013 success in winning board 
representation after a merger between OfficeDepot and Office Max); see also Anupreeta 
Das et al., Office-Gear Suppliers Discussing A Merger, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2013, at B1,  
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323495104578312262231011572 
[perma.cc/3XLZ-M69J] (reporting on the OfficeMax-Office Depot merger and Starboard 
Value’s role as an activist hedge fund). 
 37.  See Activist Investing Review, supra note 35, at 14 (reporting activist Elliott 
Management’s success in winning board seats at Emulex); see also Ian King, Emulex 
Chairman to Leave Board in Deal With Shareholders, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2013),  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-12/emulex-says-chairman-to-leave-board-in-
deal-with-shareholders.html [perma.cc/8ET5-KJSS] (announcing Emulex’s $200 million 
buyback of 30% of its stock and the stepping down of Executive Chairman James 
McCluney). 
 38.  See Activist Investing Review, supra note 35, at 15; see also David Benoit, An 
Activist Investor Top 10: Carl Icahn Takes the Crown, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT (Jan. 28, 
2014, 1:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/01/28/an-activist-investor-top-10-
carl-icahn-takes-the-crown/ [perma.cc/WYV8-4443] (reviewing Activist Insight’s top-ten 
ranking of activists in its 2013 annual review).  
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improving corporate performance and who shares the vision the activist has 
for the company. 
2. The Challenge in Recruiting Qualified Nominees 
However, despite the importance of board representation as an activist 
tool and the benefits diversity of ideas and industry expertise could bring to 
the boardroom,39 attracting qualified, unaffiliated, directors to serve on 
boards is not easy.  Since most activist campaigns are met with resistance 
from the company and the incumbent board, unaffiliated directors will have 
to endure a potentially unpleasant proxy fight, and even if elected, which is 
far from a sure thing, they would have to enter a board where they are not 
wanted and then try to shake things up.40  Indeed, it takes extra effort to 
recruit top-notch prospective directors for activists.  According to a search 
firm, many good candidates decline because “they’re scared of being on an 
activist slate,” leading search firms to contact at least three times as many 
candidates for an activist slate as they do for a conventional board search.41 
Traditionally, activist-nominated unaffiliated directors were not well-
compensated, especially compared to the activists’ general partners 
themselves.  Historically, these nominees received a modest upfront cash 
payment of $50,000 for agreeing to being nominated,42 and then, if elected, 
 
 39.  ISS stated that:  
[I]nvestors ‘may find the new bylaw provision concerning because it could deter legitimate 
efforts to seek board representation via a proxy contest, particularly those efforts that 
include independent board candidates selected for their strong, relevant industry expertise, 
and who are generally recruited, but not directly employed, by the dissident shareholder.  
Such nominees often receive a reasonable fee for agreeing to stand for election, to 
compensate them for the considerable time commitments incurred in proxy contests.’  ISS 
also argues that the bylaw could exclude highly qualified individuals, restrict the rights of 
investors to select suitable board members and entrench the existing board and management. 
Cydney Posner, ISS Takes on Bylaw Provision Designed to Deter Dissident Director 
Candidates, COOLEY (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.cooley.com/68696 [perma.cc/KT4U-
53W8]. 
 40. See id. (describing attempts to limit the service of activist directors); ISS Releases 
FAQ on Corporate Bylaws That Disqualify Director Candidates Who Received 
Compensation from Activist Shareholders, PWC BOARDROOMDIRECT (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/publications/boardroom-direct-
newsletter/january-2014-issues-in-brief.html [perma.cc/C9HF-YFA3] (discussing ISS’s 
response to new bylaw provisions disqualifying director candidates who have received 
bonuses from activists).  
 41.  See Joann S. Lublin, Activists Enlist the Help of Recruiters, WALL ST. J., Sep. 4, 
2013, at B6, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324324404579045431388717494 
[perma.cc/2EES-FTKM] (discussing the growing trend of activists enlisting the help of 
executive-search firms in filling board seats). 
 42.  See Activist Investing, HEDGE FUND LAW REPORT (Schulte Roth & Zabel), (Apr. 25, 
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received the regular director pay that board members of the target company 
received.43  However, even though the average pay for a board position at a 
major company is upward of $260,000 a year,44 these activist-nominees 
could not necessarily expect to get it for the long term, since in many cases 
the activists’ goals are to bring about major changes to the company that 
may affect its board composition and structure, including, for example, sale 
of the firm.  Even if the company would not make such drastic changes, 
these nominees were not elected as part of the management ballot, and in 
many cases they might not be re-nominated after the activist has departed.  
Thus, unlike what regular management-supported nominees might expect 
regarding their position’s longevity (and thus forecast a higher present 
value for the position), these activist-nominees might assign a much lower 
value to their board seat.  In sum, the financial rewards for being nominated 
on a short slate or as part of an agreement with the company have not been 
large. 
3. The Move Towards Supplemental Pay 
Juxtaposing the increased participation of activists in efforts to affect 
board change, which has led to greater demand for qualified candidates, 
with the general reluctance of these candidates to be activist nominated 
candidates, has led some activists to up the ante.  In an attempt to attract 
qualified candidates, activist investors are now offering to give candidates 
additional compensation packages that are tied to company performance, 
and are not just a one-time payment, on top of any payment they get from 
the firm.  These are equity-like arrangements, which could be substantial in 
their value, conditional on target company performance. 
Examples of this practice have included the 2007 case of 
JANA/CNET, and the more recent cases of JANA/Agrium, Elliott/Hess 
and Third Point/Dow.  In all of these cases, the activist sought to attract 





vide_Special_Compensation_to_Nomin.pdf, at 2 [perma.cc/WWH9-A6WG] (reporting an 
interview with the co-head of the Global Shareholder Activism practice at the law firm). 
 43.  See infra Part III on director pay (describing how directors, once elected, are 
unhindered in their power to set their own pay in the U.S.). 
 44.  See SPENCER STUART, 2014 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 36 (2014), 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/PDF%20Files
/Research%20and%20Insight%20PDFs/SSBI2014web14Nov2014.pdf [perma.cc/FR9F-
EPCM] (noting that the average compensation for S&P 500 directors had amounted to 
$263,748 in 2014).  
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activist will make if the company would do well.  In the case of CNET, 
JANA Partners, an activist hedge fund, began amassing a sizeable position 
in CNET’s common stock.45  By December 2007, citing CNET’s 
management’s and board’s lack of urgency and expertise required to turn 
CNET’s operations around, JANA announced that it would seek to replace 
two directors, amend the bylaws to expand the board by five additional 
directors, and nominate candidates to fill the new seats, thereby resulting in 
JANA nominees constituting a majority of the board.46  In addition to the 
standard agreements, the agreements with four of JANA’s nominees 
provided additional compensation in the event that they were elected as 
directors.47  Specifically, the agreement entitled the nominees to 0.3% of 
the net profits JANA would make from investments in CNET during a 
three-year window.  In the event that the nominees were not appointed or 
elected as a director of CNET, JANA agreed to pay them $50,000.48 
 
 45.  See Alistair Barr, Jana Wins Big as CBS Acquires CNet, MARKETWATCH (May 15, 
2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/jana-partners-wins-big-as-cbs-buys-cnet-for-45-
premium [perma.cc/Z3A2-UZYE] (discussing JANA’s profit from its CNET shares as a 
result of CBS’s agreement to buy CNET). 
 46.  See Jana Offers Its Plan to Help Revive CNET, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/technology/rtcnet-web.html [perma.cc/LHH9-7PQX] 
(discussing the motives and proposals of a group of activist investors in bolstering the 
earnings of CNET).  See also JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE COMMENTARY (Latham & Watkins), May 2008, at 1, 
https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2203_1.pdf [perma.cc/P9XN-8THV] 
(“CNET challenged JANA’s proposals on the grounds that CNET’s bylaws required, among 
other things, that stockholders seeking to nominate director candidates or transact other 
business at an annual meeting own at least $1,000 worth of CNET stock for at least a year, a 
requirement that JANA would not have met as of CNET’s June 2008 annual meeting”); 
John Letzing, Battle for CNet Board Control Escalates, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 13, 2008), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/battle-for-cnet-board-control-escalates 
[perma.cc/F9HX-3R7H] (“A Delaware court ruled that the firms, including Jana Partners 
LLC, . . . have the right to nominate directors and pursue their earlier stated goal of making 
changes ‘to reverse CNet’s ongoing underperformance.’”). 
 47.  For a sample agreement, see CNET Networks, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to 
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Ex. 2 (Form DFAN14A Ex. 2) (Mar. 
13, 2008); CNET Networks, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Ex. 2 (Form DFAN14A Ex. 2) (Jan. 7, 2008). 
 48.  See JANA Partners, Agreement with Jaynie Studenmund dated Dec. 23, 2007 
(Form SC 13D Ex. 9) (Jan. 7, 2008) (explaining JANA will pay its nominee Jaynie 
Studenmund $50,000 if Studenmund is not appointed or elected as a director of CNET).  
See generally David Benoit & Joann S. Lublin, Debating Activists Paying Directors, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 26, 2013, at C1, 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304281004579220094112755708 
[perma.cc/SAY8-29ZR] (“Those types of awards are common and typically disclosed, 
activists and lawyers say.  Glenview Capital Partners LP agreed to pay $100,000 each to the 
eight nominees it put up for the board of hospital operator Health Management Associates 
Inc., according to a proxy filing.  Starboard Value LP agreed to compensate its three 
nominees for the Office Depot Inc board $20,000 in cash that was to be used to buy shares 
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Five years later, JANA utilized a similar strategy in its dealings with 
Agrium, a Canadian company based in Calgary that engages in the retail of 
agricultural products and services.  In August 2012, JANA accumulated 
over 10% in Agrium, pressuring the company to return capital to 
shareholders and split its wholesale fertilizer and retail business.49  After an 
investment bank advised against the spin-off, Agrium went public, starting 
a tug of war between JANA and the Board that included numerous public 
presentations by both sides and a $881M tender offer to repurchase shares 
by the company.  By November, JANA had launched a proxy fight seeking 
the appointment of five members, including Lyle Vanclief, a former 
Canadian minister of agriculture, to the company’s thirteen-person board.50  
Engaging in a strategy similar to the one it employed during the CNET 
battle, “JANA Partners disclosed that it had agreed to pay its nominees a 
percentage of any profit that JANA earns on its Agrium shares over a three-
year period.”51  The Agrium compensation structure differed from the 
CNET compensation as JANA agreed to pay a percentage of its profits 
from its holdings in the company even if a nominee was not elected 
(although this would be a smaller sum than the one paid if such director 
were elected). 
 
in Office Depot, according to a filing.”).   
 49.  Samantha Nielson, Must Know: Why JANA Partners Sold Its Position in Agrium, 
MARKET REALIST (Mar. 5, 2014), http://marketrealist.com/2014/03/jana-partners-sold-
position-agrium/ [perma.cc/C2KB-EHKH].  See generally Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: 
Agrium Lesson for Activists: Don’t Underestimate the Adversary, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Apr. 
12, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/04/12/dealpolitik-agrium-lesson-for-
activists-dont-underestimate-the-adversary/ [perma.cc/D78D-KC3S] (discussing JANA’s 
criticism of Agrium’s poor corporate governance practices and the tension formed between 
the two companies as a result).  
 50.  See, e.g., Stephen Erlichman, Agrium payments don’t pass the ‘smell test’, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), (July 4, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/payments-dont-pass-the-smell-test/article13010420/ [perma.cc/VL6U-PCT9] 
(discussing the issues of Agrium’s decision to pay 25 cents a share to investment advisers if 
their clients voted their shares in favor of the company’s slate of board nominees and 
JANA’s promise of payments to its own nominees for Agrium’s board); Peter Goven, 
Jana’s Agrium Proxy Battle had little chance of succeeding, FIN. POST, (Apr. 12, 2013), 
http://business.financialpost.com/2013/04/12/agrium-story/ [perma.cc/Z3A4-SKHP] 
(discussing JANA’s proxy fight for seats on Agrium’s board and its subsequent failure); 
Dan McCrum, Agrium and Jana battle to woo investors,  FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb35f07a-7d2e-11e2-8bd7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3A7ae9BaY 
[perma.cc/N69N-8EJ6] (summarizing the JANA/Agrium proxy fight). 
 51.  Allen C. Goolsby & Steven M. Haas, Corporate Governance: Compensatory 
Arrangements Between Hedge Funds and Their Director Nominees, CLIENT ALERT (Hunton 
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Finally, performance-based compensation was offered in the case of 
Hess, a major gas company52 and the biggest target to date of Elliott, a $22 
billion firm run by the billionaire Paul Singer.  The hedge fund took a 4.5 
percent stake in Hess,53 launching a campaign against the company’s lack 
of discipline and accountability, and its operational shortcomings, and 
calling for a breakup of the company into an international oil exploration 
company and a domestic driller.  In response, Hess began announcing steps 
intended to raise its stock price, including selling its gas stations, raising its 
dividends, and announcing a stock buyback.  It also replaced the slate of 
directors up for re-election this year and agreed to separate the roles of 
chairman and chief executive.  Elliott’s slate of directors for the Hess board 
included Rodney F. Chase, a former deputy chief executive of BP, and 
Harvey Golub, the former chief of American Express.  Elliott also agreed 
to pay its nominees based on the company’s success after their election.54  
In addition to a one time sum of $50,000 regardless of the outcome of the 
election,55 Elliott agreed to pay each nominee, if elected, $30,000 for each 
percentage point Hess outperformed a benchmark based on the 
performance of its peer group during a three year window (but in no event 
more than $9,000,000).56 
 
 52.  For a detailed review of the Hess proxy contest timeline, see Situation Chronology: 
Hess Corporation And Elliott Management Corporation, UNSOLICITED VIEWS (Morrison 
Foerster), 2013, http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/UV-Hess-Elliott.pdf 
[perma.cc/2FVA-GRR5]. 
 53.  See Daniel Gilbert, Hess, Elliott End Proxy Fight, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2013, at 
B5, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324082604578486801887211468 
[perma.cc/M5LE-C9AP] (discussing the agreement between Hess and Elliott that ended 
their proxy fight); Michael J. De La Merced, How Elliott and Hess Settled a Bitter Proxy 
Battle, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 16, 2013, 9:11 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/hess-and-elliott-settle-fight-over-companys-board/ 
[perma.cc/HT54-KEGB] (reporting Hess’s agreement to give its opponent Elliott three 
board seats in exchange for the activist hedge fund’s support of the company’s slate of five 
directors). 
 54.  See Daniel Gilbert & Joann S. Lublin, Board Pay Fuels Hess Battle, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 26, 2013, at B8, 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323466204578382672296842906 
[perma.cc/BPA3-CZYX] (discussing dissent shareholder’s plan to give bonuses to proposed 
directors and the firm’s negative response to it); Elliott Management Calls for Board Shake-
Up at Hess, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (January 29, 2013, 8:38 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/elliott-management-calls-for-board-shake-up-at-
hess/ [perma.cc/UVC6-M75K] (describing Elliot’s slate of directors). 
 55.  Hess, Corp., Form of Engagement and Indemnification (Form PRRN14A Annex B) 
(Mar. 29 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4447/000104746913003661/a2214159zprrn14a.ht
m#le43901_annex_b [perma.cc/SW4A-FRPQ].  
 56.  If the Total Return of the Company’s common stock is 10%, and Total Return of 
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While the slates of the activists in each of these campaigns were filled 
with highly qualified nominees, in none of these battles did an activist-
nominated candidate get a board seat with the incentive package.  In the 
case of JANA/CNET, CNET sold itself before the election, allowing JANA 
to reap a nice premium on its investment. In the JANA/Agrium battle, 
JANA lost its fight and in the Elliot/Hess case, the pay deal was dropped as 
part of a settlement with the company that negated the need for contested 
elections.57 
That landscape has changed in the recent campaign of Third Point, an 
activist hedge fund headed by Dan Loeb with over $4 billion under 
management,58 against Dow Chemical Co., one of the marquee industrial 
companies in the U.S.  Third Point had been pushing Dow to spin off its 
lucrative but slow-growing petrochemical business and focus on specialty 
materials.  After talks with the company over board representation initially 
failed, Third Point filed intent to launch a proxy fight and announced that it 
had reached a compensation agreement with two nominees: former Foster 
Wheeler AG CEO Raymond Milchovich and Steve Miller, the non-
executive chairman of AIG.59  Under the agreement with the nominees, 
each has received a cash payment from Third Point equal to $250,000 in 
consideration for his agreement to serve as a nominee, each will be entitled 
to an additional cash payment of $250,000 if appointed as a director of the 
Company, and each may be entitled to two additional cash payments from 
Third Point under certain circumstances based upon the appreciation of 
Third Point stock holdings in the company after three and five years of 
service on the board, respectively.  Each nominee has agreed to hold at 
least $250,000 of Common Stock of Dow during their tenure.60 
On November 21, 2014, Dow announced that it had agreed to add to 
 
the Benchmark Peer Group is 5%, then the Hess Outperformance Percentage would be 5% 
and the payment to the director would be $150,000. See Gilbert & Lublin, supra note 54 
(“Elliott says it will pay its successful nominees $30,000 for every percentage point Hess 
stock outperforms a group of peers over three years.  If Hess stock betters its peers by 10% 
over that period, the Elliott-nominated directors would reap $300,000 from the hedge fund 
in addition to their board fees.”).  
 57.  Gilbert, supra note 53 (discussing the agreement between Hess and Elliott that 
ended their proxy fight and the further questions the revamped board raises); Goven, supra 
note 50 (describing the vote that ended the JANA/Agrium contest) 
 58.  Dan Loeb Bio, Returns, Net Worth, INSIDER MONKEY (Dec 26, 2014), 
http://www.insidermonkey.com/hedge-fund/third+point/16/ [perma.cc/45QV-GQW3].  
 59.  Dow Chem. Co., Proxy Statement (Form DFAN 14A) (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29915/000119312514411370/d818689ddfan14a.ht
m [perma.cc/Q6Y6-VQ5P]. 
 60.  Dow Chem. Co., Proxy Statement (Form DFAN 14A) (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29915/000119312514411302/d820869ddfan14a.h
tm [perma.cc/D9EC-ZSMP]. 
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the board the two Third Point nominees under an agreement with Third 
Point, making these nominees the first to sit on a board while having a side 
payment agreement in place with an activist.61 
4. The Hysteria Over Supplemental Pay 
In all of these cases, defenders of management were very critical of 
the new compensation structure.  Agrium’s chairman raised concerns 
regarding the independence of the JANA nominees by financially 
“leashing” them to JANA, “thus incentivizing them to make decisions that 
may diverge from the best interests of all of Agrium’s shareholders.”62  In 
doing so, Agrium coined the term “golden leash” with respect to these 
compensation structures.63  Similar arguments were raised by Hess in its 
battle with Elliot,64 and in the case of Provident Financial Holdings, which 
adopted a bylaw attempting to limit such compensation structures and said 
that the “trend of activists attempting to pay board members is 
‘disconcerting . . . primarily due to the potential for creating a board 
composed of directors with distinctly different motivations.’”65  The 
negative view of these structures was not solely confined to management 
and incumbents, as some prominent academics were very critical of these 
arrangements.  Prof. Bainbridge commented that “[i]f this nonsense is not 
illegal, it ought to be,”66 while Prof. Coffee stated that “[t]hird party 
bonuses create the wrong incentives, fragment the board, and imply a shift 
 
 61.  See David Benoit & Joann S. Lublin, Dow Chemical, Activist Strike a Deal, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 21, 2014, at B3, http://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-chemical-third-point-settle-
board-dispute-1416578708 [perma.cc/8MYT-2E74] (summarizing the agreement between 
Dow and Third Point). 
 62.  Saeed Teebi, Canada: ISS Pulls The Golden Leash, But Has It Gone Too Far?, 
MONDAQ (Feb. 3, 2014) 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/290618/Shareholders/ISS+Pulls+The+Golden
+Leash+But+Has+It+Gone+Too+Far [perma.cc/7672-4AP5]. 
 63.  Mr. Zaleschuk said in a letter to Agrium shareholders that “[t]his kind of ‘golden 
leash’ arrangement is unheard of in Canada and raises serious questions about the 
independence of Jana’s nominees and their ability to act in the best interests of all 
shareholders[.]” Janet McFarland, Jana’s Agrium Pay Scheme Draws Fire, THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 5, 2013, at B5, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
investor/janas-agrium-pay-scheme-draws-fire/article9256064/ [perma.cc/UH97-TH89].  
 64.  For example: 
‘There are tremendous conflicts [when] someone else is paying your directors to achieve 
goals,’ said Paul Lapides, head of the Corporate Governance Center at Kennesaw State 
University.  ‘Elliott’s nominees cannot claim independence as they have agreed to be paid 
directly by Elliott to support the hedge fund’s short-term agenda,’ a Hess spokesman said.   
Gilbert & Lublin, supra note 54. 
 65.  Benoit, supra note 3. 
 66.  Bainbridge, supra note 4. 
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toward both the short-term and higher risk[,]” and that the “end does not 
justify the means.”67 
While the initial debate regarding these payments was focused on the 
specific proxy battles described above, the activists’ adversaries have 
expanded their canvas of opposition to such payments.  Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz LLP—a law firm long noted for its work defending 
companies against activists—has urged companies to adopt bylaws that 
would bar from a board any candidate who has been paid for board 
candidacy or service by an outsider.  “A Wachtell memo warned about 
‘poisonous conflicts’ arising from ‘creating a subclass of directors.’”68  
Following that call, Wachtell has developed bylaw language disqualifying 
outside payments to directors and has advocated for its adoption by 
companies.69  Thirty-three companies had adopted such language as of 
November 30, 2013.70 
However, the effort to insulate boards through these proposed bylaws 
has appeared to stall out, as it faced strong opposition.  ISS, an influential 
proxy advisory firm, criticized it, stating it may recommend against, or 
withhold vote of, boards that adopt such measures.71  Similarly, Glass 
Lewis followed suit, stating that it will recommend that shareholders vote 
against members of the corporate governance committee at annual 
meetings if the board has adopted a bylaw that disqualifies director 
nominees with outside compensation arrangements and has done so without 
 
 67.  Coffee, supra note 5 and accompanying text.   
 68.  Benoit & Lublin, supra note 48. 
 69.  Martin Lipton, ISS Publishes Guidance on Director Compensation (and Other 
Qualification) Bylaws, THE HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Jan. 16, 
2014), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/01/16/iss-publishes-guidance-on-
director-compensation-and-other-qualification-bylaws/ [perma.cc/XW5G-NQZW]; see also 
Investors Paying Directors? Have At It, THE ACTIVIST INVESTOR BLOG (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://www.theactivistinvestor.com/
The_Activist_Investor/Blog/Entries/2013/12/3_Director_Compensation.html 
[perma.cc/M8GV-D28R] (“Around the time of the Hess annual meeting, Wachtell, Lipton 
shopped a bylaw amendment that limits significantly how shareholders can compensate 
directors.”). 
 70.  See Carl Ichan, Disqualifying Dissident Nominees: A New Trend in Incumbent 
Director Entrenchment, THE HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Feb. 
12, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/02/12/disqualifying-dissident-
nominees-a-new-trend-in-incumbent-director-entrenchment/ [perma.cc/9D56-XRNU] 
(“[T]hirty-three (33) public companies had unilaterally (i.e. without shareholder approval) 
amended their bylaws to include a Director Disqualification Bylaw.”). 
 71.  Director Qualification/Compensation Bylaw FAQ, ISS 1, 1 (Jan. 13, 2014), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/directorqualificationcompensationbylaws.pdf 
[perma.cc/YL8X-R4EV] (suggesting ISS may not support restrictive director qualification 
bylaws); see also Lipton, supra note 69 (noting ISS disapproval of restrictive director 
bylaws); Lipton, supra note 5, at 2 (“ISS faulted the Provident board for adopting this 
director qualification bylaw unilaterally.”). 
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seeking shareholder approval.72  The proxy advisory firms’ stand has led to 
a stall in the adoption of the bylaw in other companies and to a reversal of 
course in other companies.  Two early adopters of the Wachtell bylaw 
withdrew it altogether73 and other adopters faced stiff criticism following 
their move.74 
II. HOW ARE DIRECTORS PAID NOW? 
So far, this Article has provided factual background regarding 
payments to activist-paid directors and the controversy these payments 
sparked.  Before proceeding, it is important to understand how directors are 
compensated now, whether shareholders truly participate in setting their 
pay, and how directors’ current pay structure may impact their 
performance. 
A. Directors Decide How to Pay Themselves With Shareholders’ 
Money 
Under the current legal arrangements in most states, the responsibility 
and authority to set director pay lies with the board itself.75  This practice 
allows directors in U.S. public companies to decide how to pay themselves, 
using shareholders’ money, how that pay is structured, what additional 
perks and benefits they will receive, and more.  While historically, 
directors were not expected to withdraw salaries from the corporation,76 in 
 
 72.  Jack Ferdon, Restrictions on Compensation for Dissident Nominees Encounter 
Shareholder Opposition, GLASS LEWIS & CO. (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://www.glasslewis.com/blog/restrictions-compensation-dissident-nominees-encounter-
shareholder-opposition/ [perma.cc/ZWV6-M225].  
 73.  The boards of both International Game Technology and Schnitzer Steel Industries 
repealed similar provisions just months after inserting them into their bylaws.  Id. 
 74.  Provident Financial Holdings was the first among the companies approving the 
bylaw to hold an annual meeting and three directors up for reelection faced negative 
recommendation from ISS because they approved the bylaw change without a shareholder 
vote, because of the “‘lack of a compelling explanation from the board,’” and the concern 
that putting a broad restriction on compensation could lead to the exclusion of high-quality 
individuals from the board.  Gilbert & Lublin, supra note 68. 
 75. 8 Del. Code Ann. 1953, § 122 (2015).  See also 8 Del. Code Ann. 1953, § 141(h) 
(2015) (“Unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, the board 
of directors shall have the authority to fix the compensation of directors.”).  Similar statues 
allowing the board to set its own compensation are found in the Model Business 
Corporation Act and in the majority of the different state business codes.  See Charles Elson, 
Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board- The History of a Symptom 
and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 135-156 (1996) (giving a historical overview of director 
compensation).  
 76.  See Elson, supra note 75, at 136 (stating that, in the past, it was not common for 
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recent decades, following the increased demands of the job, that 
expectation has changed into a reality whereby director pay is fairly 
significant.77  And while shareholders can, in theory, amend the bylaws of 
the corporation to limit the board’s power to set its own compensation,78 
shareholders have not done so, as this entails costs that most shareholders 
refuse to incur. 
1. Director Pay in the US 
According to a 2014 Spencer Stuart survey, the average director 
compensation in the S&P 500 is $263,748.79  As further detailed in Table 1 
below, 59% of the typical average director compensation package is paid in 
equity that is tied directly to the company’s performance—53% as stock 
grants and 5% as options.80  Examining the individual director breakdown 
further reveals that while the total compensation in the S&P 500 is 
$249,590 for the year 2013, 40% of the directors in the S&P 500 earn 
above the average.81  And while most directors are close to the average, 272 
(6%) directors in S&P 500 companies earned more than $400,000 and 134 
directors (3%) made more than $500,000 in 2013.82 
 
 
directors to be paid a salary). 
 77.  See, e.g., Katherine Brown, Note, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking 
Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82 NYU L. REV. 
1102, 1119 (2007) (noting Coca-Cola’s director compensation plan); Jeff Green and Hideki 
Suzuki, Board Director Pay Hits Record $251,000 for 250 Hours, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS 
(May 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-30/board-director-pay-hits-
record-251-000-for-250-hours.html [perma.cc/4ET7-Y8Q5] (“Pay for directors at Standard 
& Poor’s 500 Index companies rose to a record average of $251,000 last year. . . .”). 
 78.  See Michael S. Melbinger, Shareholder Say on Director Pay?, WINSTON & 
STRAWN LLP  (Jan. 4, 2012) http://www.winston.com/en/executive-compensation-
blog/shareholder-say-on-director-pay.html [perma.cc/ZGV7-SGYV] (“Shareholders already 
have considerable influence over the Board and its policies through their ability to elect the 
Company’s directors on an annual basis.”). 
 79.  SPENCER STUART, supra note 44, at 7.  
 80.  Id. at 36. 
 81.  See S&P CAPITAL IQ, COMPUSTAT EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION-DIRECTOR 
COMPENSATION (June 30, 2014) (on file with author) (containing data from which this 
breakdown is derived).   
 82.  Id.  The main factors attributing to the variance in director pay are related to the 
directors’ roles on the board, i.e. whether the director serves as a chair or on one of the 
board committees, or chooses to receive compensation in equity and not cash.  See, e.g., 
HEWITT, 2010 ANALYSIS OF OUTSIDE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION 4 (2010), 
http://www.aon.com/attachments/thought-
leadership/2010_Outside_Director_Compensation.pdf [perma.cc/SJZ4-7TNU] (noting 
different fees for different types of board service).  
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Table 1: Director Pay by the Numbers (2014)83 
Total average compensation $263,748 
Average annual retainer $107,383 
Boards paying board meeting fee 25% 
Average board meeting fee $2,229 
Boards offering stock option program for directors 18% 
Boards paying equity in addition to retainer 76% 
 
Table 2: the Average Director Compensation in the S&P 500 (2013-2014)84 
 Average 
(in $)  
Highest Paid 
Director 85  
(in $) 
Highest Paid Cash Fees86  
(in $) 
Fees Earned or 
Paid in Cash 92,060 0 941,180 
Value of Stock 
Awards 117,680 13,330,030 101,400 
Value of Option 












2,400 0 26,404 
All Other 
Compensation  15,650 0 5,279 
Total 
Compensation - 
As Reported in 
SEC Filings  
249,590 13,330,030 1,074,269 
 
 83.  SPENCER STUART, supra note 4479, at 9. 
 84.  S&P CAPITAL IQ, supra note 81. 
 85.  P. Roy Vagelos from Regeneron Pharmaceuticals. 
 86.  Milton Carroll from Centerpoint Energy, Inc. 
ARTICLE 5_NILI 2-15.DOCX (NILI) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:47 PM 
2016] SERVANTS OF TWO MASTERS? 533 
 
2. Director Pay Outside the US 
The American landscape stands in sharp contrast to other jurisdictions, 
where pay levels are lower87 and shareholders must approve director pay.  
In the United Kingdom,88 a 2013 reform now requires companies to have a 
directors’ remuneration policy (which also includes a separate, forward-
looking remuneration policy section) that must be approved by 
shareholders at least every three years.89  In addition, all payments made to 
directors must be consistent with the policy, and if not, must be separately 
approved by shareholders.  Large- and medium-sized companies must also 
explain, with respect to the director’s actual performance, how each 
element of the director’s remuneration package supports the short- and 
long-term strategy of the company, its potential value, and the basis upon 
which such company has made decisions on the level of variable pay that is 
received.90  Swiss public companies, following the Minder Initiative, are 
now similarly obligated to receive shareholder approval for director 
compensation and are outright prohibited from providing certain types of 
compensation to directors.91  Germany, Italy, and Sweden have similar 
 
 87.  A report prepared by the Hay Group finds that while director remuneration and fee 
policy varies widely across Europe, the median basic policy fee paid to directors across 
Europe is €64,800, with fees for Austrian directors the lowest at €15,000 and for Swiss 
directors the highest at €197,400.  HAY GROUP, NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN EUROPE 2014 
1, 5 (Dec. 2014).  
 88.  For an investigation of the relationship between shareholder voting and executive 
compensation levels in the United Kingdom, see generally Martin Conyon & Graham 
Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in 
the UK, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 296 (2010). 
 89.  Sinead Kelly, Recent Developments in Corporate Governance October 2013, A&L 
GOODBODY (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.algoodbody.com/knowledge.jsp?i=3672 
[perma.cc/VZK2-XGX2].  The new mandatory process of the 2013 legislation moves away 
from the advisory vote that was introduced in 2002.  See Conyon & Sadler, supra note 88, at 
296 (discussing the regulations enacted in 2002 requiring a shareholder advisory vote on 
director compensation).  
 90.  See Kelly, supra note 89 (summarizing the provisions of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups 
(Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013); see also Chris Mallin et al., The 
Remuneration of Independent Directors in the UK and Italy: An Empirical Analysis Based 
on Agency Theory, 24 INT’L BUS. REV. 175, 177 (2014) (“In relation to [independent non-
executive directors’] remuneration, the UK Corporate Governance Code states that 
remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect their time commitment and 
responsibilities.  It should not include share options or other performance-related elements.  
If, exceptionally, options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance as 
holding share options could be relevant to the determination of a non-executive director’s 
independence.”). 
 91.  See Oliver Triebold et al., The Implementation of the Minder Initiative: Ordinance 
Against Excessive Compensation in Listed Joint Stock Companies, SCHELLENBERG WITTMER 
1-3 (Nov. 2013), http://www.swlegal.ch/Publications/Newsletter/The-Implementation-of-
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requirements, following the British and Swiss examples,92 and in recent 
months the European Union (“EU”) has presented a union-wide proposal 
for similar measures.93 
While the EU has elected to require shareholder approval ex-ante, 
Australia’s ‘two-strikes’ rule adopted in 2011 similarly presents an 
effective voice for shareholders regarding director pay, but in an ex-post 
manner.  Under the rule, if 25% of shareholders vote against a company’s 
remuneration report at two consecutive annual general meetings, the entire 
board may have to stand for re-election within three months.94 
 
the-Minder-Initiative-Ordina.aspx [perma.cc/86WE-P5TT] (explaining the provisions of the 
ordinance and identifying advance compensation, incentive payments for restructurings, and 
severance pay by contract as impermissible compensation); Swiss Voters Go For Binding 
Say-on-Pay: Strenuous Compensation Restrictions To Be Imposed In Renown Free Market, 
PAY GOVERNANCE LLC, http://paygovernance.com/swiss-voters-go-for-binding-say-on-pay-
strenuous-compensation-restrictions-to-be-imposed-in-renown-free-market-2 
[perma.cc/XS5R-GVHZ] (last visited Nov. 10, 2015) (detailing the requirements and 
prohibitions embodied in the text of the Minder Initiative).  
 92.  Guido Ferrarini et al., Corporate Boards in Italy, in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW 
AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE 66, (Paul Davies et al. eds., 2013).  
See also Jan Lieder & Philipp Fischer, The Say-on-Pay Movement—Evidence From a 
Comparative Perspective, 8 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 376, 384-86 (2011) (describing 
Germany’s adoption of an optional, non-binding say-on-pay rule in 2009 with reference to 
Sweden’s adoption of a similar say-on-pay rule in 2006).  See generally Guido Ferrarini et 
al., Understanding Directors’ Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical Analysis 
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 126/2009, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418463 [perma.cc/C9XX-JD5R] (discussing the adoption of say-
on-pay rules in Europe). 
 93.  See Emily Chasan, European Commission Proposes Binding Say-on-Pay, WALL 
ST. J. CFO J. (Apr. 9, 2014, 2:47 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/04/09/european-
commission-proposes-binding-say-on-pay/ [perma.cc/P35G-M9LD] (“The European 
Commission on Wednesday proposed measures aimed at giving more rights to shareholders, 
including a binding ‘say- on- pay’ shareholder vote on executive compensation.”); James 
Kanter, European Official Urges ‘Say on Pay’ Requirements for Boards, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Apr. 9, 2014, 3:15 PM) 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/european-official-urges-requirement-for-
shareholder-vote-on-director-pay/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [perma.cc/M37P-H7VV ] 
(“A European Union official renewed his efforts to curb excessive pay by introducing a plan 
[recently] that would require a shareholder vote on salaries for directors of publicly traded 
companies.”); Say on Pay Proposals from Europe, LINKLATERS (Apr. 15, 2014) 
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Employment-and-
Incentives/Remuneration/Pages/Say-on-pay-proposals-Europe.aspx [perma.cc/PBA4-
YN8Z] (outlining the proposal requirements and legislative timeline). 
 94.  Reza Monem & Chew Ng, Australia’s “Two-Strikes” Rule and the Pay-
Performance Link: Are Shareholders Judicious?, 9 J. OF CONTEMP. ACCT. & ECON. 237, 
239-40 (2013) (describing the key features of Australia’s “two-strikes” say-on-pay rule); 
Matt Orsagh, “Say on Pay”: How Voting on Executive Pay Is Evolving Globally — and Is It 
Working?, CFA INST. (Dec. 26, 2013), 
http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2013/12/26/say-on-pay-how-votes-on-
executive-pay-is-evolving-globally-and-is-it-working/ [perma.cc/VW6B-H9EA] 
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B. Director Pay as a Function of Director Tenure 
The issue of directors’ unchecked power to set their own pay in the 
U.S. is further augmented by directors’ firm grip on their seats.  Because 
director elections in the U.S. are rarely contested, each director not only 
controls the level of her pay, but also the duration of it.  This provides 
directors not only with discretion regarding their annual pay, but also their 
future expected value since they can also decide for how long they will 
receive this pay stream. 
It is no surprise then that the average board tenure for the entire S&P 
500 composite in 2013 is 8.69 years, or that on the individual director level, 
the number of directors in the S&P 500 with very long tenure is also 
significant.  For the year 2012 the number of S&P 500 directors with tenure 
exceeding fifteen years was 720, which was approximately 14% of the 
directors sampled, and the director with the longest tenure has served for 
fifty years.  These figures are further corroborated by the low turnover rate 
of directors, as the average turnover of board members and appointment of 
new directors has decreased in recent years: the number of new appointees 
has dropped by 12% over the past five years and by 27% over the past ten 
years.  In 2012, the number of new independent directors fell to 291, which 
consists of around 5% of the directors in the S&P 500, the lowest number 
documented since 2001.95 
 
(contemplating the effectiveness of say-on-pay rules in various jurisdictions across the 
globe, including Australia). 
 95.  Data for the year 2012 was obtained from the BoardEx database, which contains 
various statistics on all public companies in the U.S., including average board tenure for the 
years 2003-2012.  BOARDEX, BOARDEX DATA (Mar. 28, 2013) (on file with author).  This 
data was further corroborated by similar data that was obtained from the RiskMetrics data 
file for the years 2007-2012.  INST. S’HOLDER SERV. INC., RISKMETRICS GROUP (on file with 
author).  Data was also obtained from several reports.  KORN/FERRY INT’L, 33RD ANNUAL 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY (Aug. 19, 2008), http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/reports-
insights/33rd-annual-board-directors-study [perma.cc/TDX3-KMTY]; SPENCER STUART, 
2010 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX (2010); GEORGESON, 2012 ANNUAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2012), http://www.computershare-
na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2012.pdf [perma.cc/VX4A-WAFB]; SPENCER 
STUART, 2012 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 
(2012); SPENCER STUART, 2013 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX (2013); 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INSIGHTS FROM THE BOARDROOM 2012: BOARD EVOLUTION: 
PROGRESS MADE, YET CHALLENGES PERSIST, ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY 
(2012), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/annual-corporate-directors-
survey/assets/pdf/pwc-annual-corporate-directors-survey.pdf [perma.cc/L4Z3-SEB6]; 2015 
Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey, SHEARMAN & STERLING,  
http://shearman.uberflip.com/i/581509-2015-corporate-governance-executive-
compensation-survey [perma.cc/ENK2-SRTR] (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
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Table 3: Board Tenure per Company (S&P 500)96 
Year Average Board 































2012 8.67 14% 64% 18% 4% 
2013 8.69 18% 62% 16% 4% 
 
Table 4: Individual Director Tenure (S&P 500)97 
Year Average 
Director 







































In sum, with an annual pay that ranges between $200,000 and 
$400,000 and average tenure of 8.7 years, a director could receive expected 
compensation from her position that ranges from $2 million to $3 million. 
C. Do Shareholders Implicitly Set Director Pay? 
While shareholders may not have an explicit say regarding director 
compensation, one can argue that shareholders implicitly set director pay 
because they can choose to not elect directors who excessively compensate 
themselves.  In reality, however, most elections go uncontested, with 
directors not removed against their will.98  For example, in 2013 there were 
only thirty-five contested elections in companies in the Russell 3000, and 
 
 96.  See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting data sources). 
 97.  See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting data sources). 
 98.  See Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 701-02 (“[M]ost elections will likely be 
uncontested. . . .  Under existing default arrangements, shareholders do not have any 
meaningful power to veto candidates put forward by the board in an uncontested election.”). 
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only fourteen of those elections were in companies with a market cap 
exceeding $1 billion.99  Even within the subset of contested elections, in 
most cases an agreement with the board was reached prior to the actual 
elections, reducing the threat to incumbent directors.  Moreover, although 
contested elections are on an upward trend100 and have seen an increased 
success rate,101 and while they may impact the career of a target company 
director,102 they are still a drop in the bucket as they occur at only slightly 
over one percent of the companies in the Russell 3000 index.103 
Similarly, one might argue that majority voting, a trend that has been 
gaining steam in corporate governance104 and that some institutional 
investors consider to be the focal point of their governance strategy, could 
have contributed to an effort to make directors more accountable to 
 
 99.  THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CHART OF THE WEEK: PROXY CONTESTS BY INDEX AND 
REASON (Oct. 2013), https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-
CW-032.pdf&type=subsite [perma.cc/5R6W-NKFL]; see also John Lovallo, Proxy Contests 
on the Rise–Activists Emboldened by Success, LEVICK DAILY (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://levick.com/blog/2013/10/28/proxy-contests-rise-%E2%80%93-activists-emboldened-
success [perma.cc/LQR8-J4RM] (analyzing the 2013 proxy season). 
 100.  See Lovallo, supra note 99 (“[A]ctivist shareholders are driving a significant uptick 
in proxy contests.  During the first half of 2013, Russell 3000 companies saw more than a 
45% spike over the same period last year.”). 
 101.  See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Model Business Corporation Act at Sixty: Shareholders 
and Their Influence, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 25 (2011) (“In recent years not only 
has there been an increase in proxy fights, but there also has been an increase in the relative 
success of such fights.”). 
 102. See Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder Democracy in Play: 
Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J. OF FIN. ECON. 316, 317 (2014) (“[P]roxy 
contests are associated with significant adverse effects on the careers of incumbent 
directors.  Following a proxy contest, incumbents lose seats from on targeted boards. . . .  
Furthermore, following a proxy contest, directors experience a significant decline in the 
number of seats on other boards. . . .  Overall, facing a direct threat of removal is associated 
with $1.3–$2.9 million in foregone income until retirement for the median incumbent 
director.”). 
 103.  See BEBCHUK & WEISBACH, supra note 6, at 327 (“In recent years, the most 
important players in the activism landscape have been activist hedge funds. . . .  Unlike 
activist shareholders who mounted proxy fights and takeover bids in the past, the activist 
hedge funds that attracted the limelight in the past decade . . . try to affect the way in which 
the company is run or to get the company to be acquired by someone else.”); Fairfax, supra 
note 101, at 25 (suggesting the upward trend of proxy fights may be shifting); see also John 
Laide, Proxy Fight Season, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (Feb. 4, 2010), 
https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=
1&pg=/pub/rs_20100204.html&ProxyFight_Season&rnd=284029 [perma.cc/U6H5-NVFY]  
(noting an average of 53 annual proxy fights between 2006 and 2009).  
 104.  Roughly 80% of the companies in the S&P 500 have a majority voting policy in 
place. See Holly J. Gregory, Trends in Director Elections, PRAC. L. 20 (Sept. 2, 2012) 
(“[A]bout 80% of S&P 500 companies have since adopted some form of majority voting, 
with many companies adopting it voluntarily to avoid a high vote on a shareholder 
proposal.”). 
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shareholders by presenting a realistic possibility of directors losing their 
seat, even in uncontested elections, if they failed to achieve majority 
support.  However, in many cases directors could still be retained by the 
company even if required to resign and such resignation was tendered.105  
Indeed, in practice, majority voting is of limited use; a recent study finds 
that: 
[A]mong the 60,920 director elections held at Russell 3000 
companies during the three years 2010, 2011, and 2012, in 176 
cases (0.3%) directors failed to achieve a majority of votes cast in 
director elections conducted under any voting format.106 
In addition, nearly 85% of the directors of public companies that did 
not receive a majority of votes are still on the board two years later.107 
 Hence, the only effective way that directors can be removed, without 
cause, is through a proxy fight, usually brought by an activist investor.  
This is the value activists bring to the table, and why they are generally 
supported by institutional investors.108 
 
 105.  For a critique regarding the current affair of majority voting, see Letter from Jeff 
Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, CII to John Carey, Vice President-Legal, NYSE Regulation, 
Inc.,(Jun. 20, 2013), 
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2013/06_20_13_cii_letter_ny
se_majority_voting.pdf [perma.cc/L5B7-NURC].  Recent empirical studies are conflicted 
about whether majority voting in its current form even carries value.  Compare Jay Cai et 
al., A Paper Tiger? An Empirical Analysis of Majority Voting, 21 J. OF CORP. FIN. 119, 133 
(2013) (“[F]irms that adopt majority voting do not experience changes in director votes, 
director turnover, or improvement in performance.  The bulk of our evidence, with the 
exception of the positive announcement returns for the majority voting proposals, is 
consistent with the paper tiger hypothesis: majority voting has no significant impact on 
director election, firm performance, and shareholder wealth.”), with Yonca Ertimur et al., 
Does the Director Election System Matter? Evidence from Majority Voting, 20 REV. OF 
ACCT. STUD. 1, 1 (2015) (“Overall, it appears that, rather than a channel to remove specific 
directors, director elections are viewed by shareholders as a means to obtain specific 
governance changes and that, in this respect, their ability to obtain such changes is stronger 
under a [majority voting] standard.”). 
 106.  ANNUAL SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS AND THE CONUNDRUM OF “UNELECTED 
DIRECTORS”, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION 1 (Jun. 23, 2014), 
http://capmktsreg.org/app/uploads/2014/06/CCMR-Unelected-Directors-Statement-2014-
06-23.pdf [perma.cc/2RGG-7R39]. 
 107.  Id. at 2. 
 108.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 863, 897 (2013) (“[Activist investors] are governance entrepreneurs, arbitraging 
governance rights that become more valuable through their activity monitoring companies 
to identify strategic opportunities and then presenting them to institutional investors for their 
approval—through a proxy fight, should the portfolio company resist the proposal.  By 
giving the institutions this choice, the activists increase the value of governance rights; the 
institutions’ exercise of governance rights then becomes the mechanism for creating value 
for beneficial owners.”).  See also supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting that there is 
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III. THE BENEFITS OF ACTIVISTS SUPPLEMENTING DIRECTOR 
COMPENSATION WITH PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY 
Since shareholder activism, particularly the type conducted by hedge 
funds, has been shown to be beneficial,109 shareholders should be interested 
in facilitating effective activist campaigns.  Even those who might be 
skeptical regarding the value of activists’ turnarounds in general or the 
value of a specific campaign should be interested in facilitating a 
framework in which the activist can take its best shot at convincing 
shareholders to support its campaign.  That, in and of itself, should lead 
incumbent directors and management to better their own performance as 
well as providing shareholders with a larger pool of nominees, a selection 
that should improve the board in the long run.110  As this Part will detail, 
allowing activists to appoint non-affiliated directors, and particularly 
qualified talent, is germane to both shareholders and activist interests.  In 
that context, paying directors helps recruit talent that would otherwise not 
serve on a board for regular director pay, and structuring it as performance-
based pay serves a number of useful functions that may not be achieved by 
fixed compensation. 
A. Why is There A Need for Non-Affiliated Directors? 
As a preliminary matter, one might ask why activists need to attract 
and recruit outside candidates, instead of securing their own seats.  Indeed, 
many activists nominate themselves to serve on boards in which they are 
active.111  However, in many cases having a non-affiliated director, 
 
a debate over the merits of increased shareholder activism in the governance of widely held 
corporations). 
 109.  See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the beneficial effects of shareholder activism as 
supported by recent studies).  
 110.  Granted, a reoccurring line of argument claims that the costs of fighting the 
activists and the damage to board cohesiveness would make shareholders worse off.  
However, there are strong reasons to doubt the strength of these arguments in the specific 
context of board supplemental pay.  First, if activists are going to launch proxy fights with 
or without these paid-directors, then shareholders are better off with the better candidates, 
all other things held equal.  Similarly, if shareholders elect to side with the activist, 
assuming board cohesiveness is at risk (an assumption that this Article doubts), there again, 
shareholders are better off with the better candidates.  Moreover, incumbent directors are 
more likely to get along with independent candidates rather than the activist fund’s general 
partners, which is another strong argument favoring activist-paid directors.  
 111.  There are numerous cases where this is the standard approach of the activist.  See, 
e.g., Steve Schaefer, Bill Ackman Says J.C. Penney Board Is ‘Flying Blind,’ Chairman 
Needs To Go, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2013
/08/09/ackman-j-c-penney-board-is-flying-blind-chairman-needs-to-go/ [perma.cc/8JGS-
YNQ5 ] (describing Pershing Square’s appointment of Bill Ackman to the board of J.C. 
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especially a talented candidate, is the better outcome for both the activist 
and shareholders.  In these cases, recruiting the most qualified non-
affiliated director should be the preferred way, rather than filling the seat 
with the activist itself or appointing a less suitable outside candidate.  As 
explained below, both the attributes that the non-affiliated director could 
bring to the table and the structure of the activist itself provide strong 
justifications for the appointment of non-affiliated directors. 
 
Industry Expertise 
While activists are savvy businessman, they are, for the most part, 
lacking actual experience in traditional corporate work.  Moreover, activists 
often target different companies from different industries.  While the 
activists’ expertise in financial structuring and ‘governance know-how’ 
could translate into many different industries, they are still lacking in the 
day-to-day know-how of the specific business they are targeting.  Placing a 
nominee who agrees with the activist’s general turnaround road-map, but 
also has the ability to provide specific input regarding the more unique 
aspects of the business, would add value to the activist plans and to the 
company and its board, and in turn would serve all shareholders, including 
the activist itself. 
 
Resource Allocation 
Since most activist hedge funds have a small ledger of partners, 
outsourcing the board seat nomination is, in many cases, the preferred route 
from the perspective of time and resource allocation.  By nominating a non-
affiliated director, the activist is unencumbered by the duties and 
responsibilities of the board position.  Therefore, the activist is free to focus 
on more targets than it otherwise would have targeted if it had to sit at each 
of the firms with its equity positions. 
 
The Benefits of Separation 
The separation between directors and activists, created by the 
appointment of non-affiliated directors, has several benefits.  Specifically, 
even if a given activist had the necessary industry expertise and the time to 
sit on the board, it still could be useful for the activist to create separation 
 
Penney); Phil Wahba,  Activist Investor Jana’s Biggest Get Yet: 2 Walgreen Board Seats, 
FORTUNE (Sep. 8, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/09/08/jana-walgreen-board-seats/ 
[perma.cc/R4GM-GADF] (discussing how JANA Partners’ founder and managing partner 
Barry Rosenstein is on the board of Walgreen, of which he is also an activist investor); 
Richard Waters, Microsoft Cedes Board Seat to ValueAct, FIN. TIMES, (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d4b2cafa-11c1-11e3-a14c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3zGQxf2jq 
[perma.cc/2VKZ-KFFQ] (discussing the appointment of a ValueAct general partner to the 
board of Microsoft). 
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between itself and the position of the board nominee. 
First, non-affiliated directors are useful because they allow activists to 
continue trading in the shares of the company and other companies in the 
industry, without insider trading concerns.112  Similarly, activists may 
prefer the appointment of an independent director since if they appoint one 
of their employees, the “director by deputization theory” could subject 
them to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that prohibits 
short-swing profits.113  Hence, this limits the activists’ ability to trade in the 
company stock. 
Third, activists might suffer from internal conflict of interests, or 
could be otherwise ineligible to perform their duties as board members, due 
to board restrictions on other board memberships.114 
 
 112.  See Hushmail: Are Activist Hedge Funds Breaking Bad?, M&A COMMENTARY 
(Latham & Watkins), Jun. 23, 2014, at 3, http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-activist-
investors-hushmail [perma.cc/J4VP-L6D3] (acknowledging the difficulty in a quick 
disposal of shares for activists with board representation because of restrictions created by 
insider trading policies and SEC rules).  See generally Matt Levine, ValueAct Hedge Fund’s 
Huge Microsoft Victory, FORBES (Sep. 3, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/09/03/valueact-hedge-funds-huge-microsoft-
victory/ [perma.cc/P4E3-QS5G ] (describing that the ValueAct’s gaining of a board seat in 
Microsoft demonstrates the new power of activist investors in financial markets). 
 113.  An investor that has designated a director to a public company’s board may be 
subject to the short-swing trading rules in Section 16(b), which authorize an issuer to 
recover any profit realized by directors from a ‘round-trip’ purchase and sale (or sale and 
purchase) of an equity security within six months.  See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 409-
10 (1962) (stating that an investor may be deemed a ‘director’ for Section 16(b) purposes if 
it deputizes a person to perform its duties on the board).  For more discussion on Section 
16(b), the rationale for this rule, and its impact, see Renée Sekino, Second Circuit Holds 
That “Directors By Deputization” Qualify for Rule Exempting Certain Approved 
Transactions from Short-Swing Liability, LITIG. (Milbank), Apr. 16, 2008, at 1-3, 
http://www.milbank.com/images/content/8/4/845/041608-Directors-by-Deputization.pdf 
[perma.cc/26EF-WV7Y].  See also Marc Weingarten & Neil P. Horne, Be Careful What 
You Wish For — Considerations When Obtaining Board Representation, ACTIVIST 
INVESTING DEVS. (Schulte Roth & Zabel), 2006, at 3, 5, 
http://www.srz.com/files/upload/Weingarten_BeCarefulWhatYouWishFor_AIDevelopment
s_Spring06.pdf [perma.cc/6YV6-U8YC] (explaining that if the designated investor appears 
to exercise control over the director, a court may find that the investor itself is a director for 
Section 16(b) purposes, whereas keeping the director’s decision making independent of the 
investor could entirely avoid the investor’s exposure to Section 16(b)).  For further 
discussion on short-swing profit rules and types of circumstances under which “director by 
deputization” applies to a private equity fund, see also Carol Anne Huff & Elisabeth Martin, 
Director Equity Awards to PE Fund Representatives on Public Company Boards, INSIGHTS: 
THE CORPORATE & SEC. LAW ADVISOR 2, 3 (Sep. 2012),  
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Insights%20(Director%20Equity%20Award
s_%20Huff%20byline).pdf [perma.cc/5SP3-2646]. 
 114.  Weingarten & Horne, supra note 113, at 3-4.  See David M. Morris et al., 
Designated Directors and Designating Investors: Early Planning Is Key, INT’L LAW OFFICE 
(Jun. 16, 2008), 
ARTICLE 5_NILI 2-15.DOCX 5 (NILI) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:47 PM 
542 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
Fourth, having an unaffiliated nominee would, in cases of contested 
elections, makes it easier for the activist to convince other shareholders to 
support the activist ballot.  By nominating an unaffiliated, impressive 
candidate, the activist can reassure shareholders that (1) such nominee 
would have the ability to act for the benefit of all shareholders and not just 
the activist, and (2) that an industry expert was convinced of the validity 
and favorable outcome of the activist’s turnaround plan.  The recent high 
profile case of Airgas/Air Products perfectly illustrates this point.  Air 
Products, in its efforts to convince shareholders in its intentions, 
specifically stated in its press release that the three nominated directors 
were independent from both Airgas and Air Products and that these 
nominees would serve the shareholders as a whole (a statement that came 
true when these directors decided to reject Air Products’ final bid).115 
Finally, even in cases where a negotiated agreement with management 
is reached prior to the elections, many boards prefer that the activist itself 
would not sit on the board, particularly if the events prior to the agreement 
were not too amicable.  In that respect, allowing the board to ‘save face’ 
and choose a candidate from a pre-determined list set by the activist, as is 
done in many cases,116 could better facilitate the activist’s long term plan 
for the company. 
 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=13c8e903-9a06-4373-
a39f-e485b73cc715#31 [perma.cc/8HRR-Y7PK] (describing various situations where 
conflicts arise amongst the interests of directors, investors, and corporations, and 
restrictions, such as those regarding voting and trading, that designated directors and 
investors face).  
 115.  See Press Release, Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., Air Prods. Notifies Airgas of Proxy 
Solicitation at 2010 Annual Meeting (May 13, 2010), 
http://www.airproducts.com/company/news-center/2010/05/0513-air-products-notifies-
airgas-of-proxy-solicitation-at-2010-annual-meeting.aspx [perma.cc/7Y2F-SHR2] (stating 
that the three nominees have notable qualifications and experiences that make them suitable 
for serving as independent Board directors and in the best interests of shareholders).  For a 
more complete review of the case, see Steven M. Davidoff, Case Study: Air Products v. 
Airgas and the Value of Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 508 
(2012), in which Air Products made a hostile offer to Airgas, whose directors announced a 
unanimous rejection of the offer that had excessively underestimated the value of Airgas. 
 116.  See David E. Rosewater & Nicholas Tomasetti, Proxy Contest Settlement 
Agreements: An Overview, ACTIVIST INVESTING DEVS. (Schulte Roth & Zabel), 2009, at 1, 
http://www.srz.com/files/News/8f72fe1b-68bd-4b9a-b941-
0959673ff622/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ee313e64-e311-42ca-ba25-
04ddf3f859b0/AIDev_Winter09_Proxy.pdf [perma.cc/TW7S-PNHH] (discussing how the 
activist and company can benefit and save valuable resources through settlement agreements 
in early stages of proxy fights).   
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B. The Frequent Need to Supplement Regular Director Pay 
Putting the benefits of unaffiliated directors aside, the question 
remains as to why activists should pay them handsomely on top of their 
regular board fees.  However, finding people to serve as activist-nominated 
directors is not an easy task as one might think, which leads to the need to 
supplement pay. 
From the activist perspective, the activist wants a nominee who is 
distinctively qualified, with a unique skill set that is suited for that specific 
company.  Because the activist has a lot at stake, financially and as a matter 
of reputation, it is in the activist’s interest to find a candidate that would 
bring value to the table, and in many cases, such value needs to exceed the 
value of the incumbent director.  This makes the pool of candidates limited 
to begin with.  That same stake in the game would lead the activist to look 
for candidates that not only possess the qualifications necessary for the job 
but that would also have the ability and desire to bring the activist’s goals 
for the target company into fruition.  This is not a trophy position to hold 
and enjoy, and as such, the pool of possible candidates who would be 
interested in it is significantly smaller.117 
Similar challenges exist from the potential nominee’s perspective.  A 
qualified person with the skill set the activist seeks will have other options 
to consider.  Even if such candidate is interested in the position as a general 
matter, if she accepts the invitation, she will need to learn the business well 
and go through a proxy fight, which she may lose (with the reputational 
and personal ramifications this might entail) and which may subject her to 
extreme scrutiny from the company and shareholders.  Even if she wins the 
fight, she will still have to get on a board that did not, and might still not, 
want her.  Additionally, she will have to try to convince the rest of the 
board to put in place changes that will generate shareholder value.  Finally, 
such a candidate might harm her potential to sit on other boards as she will 
likely not be chosen by management of other companies to sit on their 
boards because she will be identified as an “activist-affiliated” director. 
Indeed, the above gives merit to the argument that it may well be the 
case that standard director compensation is not enough to attract good 
candidates to a dissident slate.118  Standard compensation is regularly set by 
 
 117.  To take the CNET example, JANA’s nominees included Julius Genachowski (who 
later became the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission) and Jon Miller 
(who later became Chief Digital Officer for News Corp).  See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text (chronicling the JANA/CNET proxy fight).  
 118.  See Laura Seery Cole, Designated Directors in the Boardroom: Their Impact on 
Governance and Performance and Shareholder Wealth Effects, 9 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee), http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1068 
[https://perma.cc/8QRS-KRPK] (discussing the high costs and dissuading effects that 
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boards based on assumptions of a collegial board and expectation of a 
steady stream of payments for a long duration (as the average board tenure 
is about nine years).119  However, activist intervention, whether by itself or 
due to the underlying issues the target is facing, severely undermines these 
assumptions (for example, if the firm is sold).  Board nominees, then, 
internalize these considerations into their pay expectations, asking for more 
money up-front to compensate for the greater risk of loss of future 
payments. 
To illustrate this point: suppose X, a highly established individual, is 
approached by an activist who wishes to nominate X to its slate.  X, 
knowing the activist’s general time frame, expects to serve for three years 
on the board if elected and for an annual salary of $250,000 per year.  This 
means a total of $750,000 if X is elected (which is not a sure thing).  In 
return, X has to go through a proxy fight, attend board meetings as an 
outsider, and push hard for change.  Many talented people can make this 
amount of money doing much more enjoyable things over a shorter period 
of time.  Unless X is interested in the nomination for other reasons, the 
financial component of regular board compensation will probably not be a 
strong factor in convincing X to agree. 
While some might argue that the fact that supplemental compensation 
is not offered in most cases is indicative of the lack of need for it, there are 
strong reasons to think otherwise.  First, the fact that an activist was able to 
nominate a candidate without a pay package does not mean that this 
candidate was the optimal candidate, thereby effectively reducing the value 
the director would bring to the table.  Second, some targets require an 
emphasis on management turnover, and thus do not require a specific board 
expertise.  In these cases, having the activist or other ‘standard’ 
independent director could suffice.  However, in cases where the change is 
expected to be driven at the board level, and where a specific ‘star’ 
nominee is required, supplemental pay might be the only way to go.  Third, 
since activists incur high entry costs, and since reputation and 
connectedness play an important role in recruiting nominees, the fact that 
established activists, like Pershing Square, are able to recruit top candidates 
even without pay, does not mean that other activists can follow suit with 
the same success.  Supplemental pay could then be a means to lower some 
of the entry barriers that these activists might face. 
 
contentious elections have on potential directors). 
 119.  See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting data sources). 
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C. Why Performance-Based Pay 
So far, I have argued that activists cannot, or should not, just appoint 
their own people to all of their various slates, but could rather benefit from 
utilizing the outside market for directors.  I have also shown why some 
good candidates, who could help the company and in turn benefit 
shareholders, might not agree to be nominated if offered the regular pay 
package incumbent directors receive.  However, even if supplemental pay 
is beneficial and needed in some instances, why should it be performance-
based?  Structuring director pay is a complex issue, but in the context of 
activist nominees there are several advantages to a performance-based pay. 
First, performance-based pay provides activists with an effective 
screening function.  Since the activist’s outlook for the company is 
positive, supplemental compensation that is conditioned on the positive 
outlook coming to life allows the activist to recruit people who are 
similarly optimistic about their ability to make changes at the firm, as 
otherwise they would decline the position if in their estimation the 
activist’s goals are unachievable.120  Similarly, the willingness of these 
nominees to take the job, knowing that their pay is dependent on the 
activist’s plan coming into life, serves as a screening tool to shareholders 
who can see if the activist were able to convince sophisticated players such 
as these nominees in its plan. 
Second, performance-based compensation provides the activist with a 
signaling tool.121  Since the activist has a positive outlook for the company, 
and the activist would like to convince its fellow shareholders of the 
sincerity of such belief, bringing board nominees that buy into this outlook 
and are incentivized to turn the positive outlook into a reality serves as a 
strong signaling tool to fellow shareholders. 
Third, performance pay provides the activist with a risk-sharing 
 
 120.  For a general review of screening theory, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of 
“Screening,” Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 283 
(1975). 
 121.  For a discussion of signaling in the context of board structure, see S. Trevis Certo, 
Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: Signaling with Board Structures, 
28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 432, 434-39 (2003).  For a general review of signaling theory, see 
Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 355-56 (1973).  In the VC 
context, signaling plays an important role.  See, e.g., Christian Hopp & Christian Lukas, A 
Signaling Perspective on Partner Selection in Venture Capital Syndicates, 38 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 635 (2014) (analyzing the factors impacting partnering 
decisions in VC syndicates from a signaling perspective using VC transactions in Germany); 
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from 
Venture Capitalist Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2177, 2200 (2004) (noting that ex ante staging using 
explicit milestones is a way for VCs to screen out bad firms because it signals internal 
risks). 
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element.  The activist is bearing significant risks in any engagements with 
target companies.  While the costs of an engagement with the target are 
certain, the rewards are far from it.  The activist has to incur various costs 
throughout the process, from investing in research, the costs of 
engagements, and equity costs (including alternative investment costs), but 
the success of its fight with incumbents, and the potential rewards, is not 
guaranteed.  Even if the activist wins the fight with management, its 
turnaround plan, as sound and promising as it may be, might not work out.  
So, while the activist is willing to incur up-front out-of-pocket costs to turn 
around a company in a way that is expected to generate positive 
externalities for other shareholders, the activist does not want to pay more 
than it has to.  Performance-based pay reduces the downside costs, as the 
nominees will only get paid if things work out as planned. 
Finally, and possibly most importantly, performance-based pay, if 
structured correctly, is beneficial on its own merits, as it will provide the 
nominee with enhanced motivation to work hard and to achieve the 
performance thresholds that would benefit the company as a whole.122  The 
benefits of performance-based compensation in incentivizing employees to 
invest efficient resources have been greatly detailed in academic 
literature123 and are just as relevant in the case of directors. 
D. The Benefits of Activism Enhanced with Supplemental Pay 
While activism, or the threat of it, is already beneficial, there are 
strong reasons to believe that supplemental pay would enhance these 
 
 122.  For a review of the benefits of incentivized pay, see generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK 
& JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION (2009).  
 123.  The literature on executive pay and pay for performance benefits is vast.  See 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 
J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 8, 12-17 (2005) (demonstrating that the pay-setting process in U.S. 
public companies does not follow the arm’s-length model and highlighting potential ways to 
better align manager and shareholder interests through pay arrangements); see also Todd A. 
Gormley et al., CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk: Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 79, 154 (2013) (confirming empirically the relationship 
between the structure of managerial compensation and corporate responses to risk); Michael 
C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. 
POL. ECON. 225, 227 (1990) (estimating the change in CEO wealth relative to the change in 
shareholder wealth); Steven N. Kaplan, Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance in the United States: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 2 CATO PAPERS ON 
PUB. POL’Y 99 (2012) (challenging the common perceptions that CEOs are overpaid and are 
neither paid for their performance nor penalized for poor performance); Kevin J. Murphy, 
Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, 2 HANDBOOK ECON. FIN. 
211, 213 (2013) (documenting the current state, history, and international comparisons of 
CEO pay as institutional context to help formulate a general theory). 
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benefits.  The ability to attract top-flight candidates to an activist slate 
would have positive impacts on both companies that are targeted by the 
activist and those that are not.  First, since attracting better candidates 
would improve the activist’s chances to win a potential proxy fight, this 
would serve as a more effective deterrent tool ex-ante, making management 
more accountable to shareholders, since management would know that the 
chances of a successful bid are higher.  Second, when an activist does 
launch a proxy fight, the outcome would be better for shareholders of the 
target.  On the one hand, since management would take the risk more 
seriously, it is likely to take action that would benefit shareholders.  On the 
other hand, if these nominees are elected, they would be better equipped 
and better incentivized to improve shareholder value.  Third, to the extent 
supplemental pay would allow activists to engage with more companies, 
both the effectiveness of the ex-ante deterrence effect and the actual 
improvement to targets ex-post would be enhanced. 
IV. OBJECTIONS TO ACTIVIST PAID-DIRECTORS 
So far, the benefits stemming from the appointment of non-affiliated 
directors and providing them with performance-based supplemental pay 
were detailed.  This Article now turns to identify, and respond to, three 
common objections to activist-paid directors: (1) they lack independence; 
(2) they will reduce board cohesion; and (3) they will cause the firm to be 
too short-term oriented.124 
 
 124.  In a memo issued by the firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Martin Lipton and 
fellow attorneys summarized their objection to outside director pay, stating that it would 
undermine “[b]oard prerogatives to set director pay,” would create “a multi-tiered, 
dysfunctional Board in which a subset of directors are compensated and motivated 
significantly differently from other directors,” would create “economic incentives to take the 
corporation in the specified direction, and within the timeframe, that would trigger outsized 
compensation, whether or not doing so would be in the best interests of all shareholders, 
would engender inappropriate and excessive risk, or would sacrifice long-term value for 
short-term gain,” would open “a schism between the personal interests of directors who 
stand to benefit in the short-term from the special compensation scheme and the interests of 
shareholders with a longer-term investment horizon,” would create “poisonous conflicts in 
the boardroom by creating a subclass of directors who have a significant monetary incentive 
to sell the corporation or manage it to attain the highest possible stock price in the short-run” 
and would introduce “unnecessary and problematic complexity and conflicts in strategic 
reviews and calling into question those directors’ ability to satisfy their fiduciary duties.”  
Martin Lipton et al., Bylaw Protection against Dissident Director Conflict/Enrichment 
Schemes, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM UPDATE (May 9, 2013), 
http://www.scribd.com/embeds/140691513/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll 
[perma.cc/E57T-58KS].  For a detailed review of the general arguments against activists and 
a response, see Bebchuk 2013, supra note 24. 
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A. Lack of “Independence” 
In a widely held public company, it is important that directors be 
independent of those controlling the firm’s day to day operations—the 
managers—who have interests that at times might be adverse to those of 
shareholders.125 However, while director independence is important, it is 
necessary to identify from whom directors need to be independent.  In the 
context of the U.S. widely held public firm, it is not important that directors 
be independent of shareholders as a group;126 in fact, such independence 
would be undesirable, since the directors are elected by the shareholders to 
promote their interests. 
Wachtell, and other opponents of these pay arrangements, have argued 
that ‘golden leashes’ prevent dissident directors from being ‘independent.’  
This Article addresses this line of opposition and explains that activist-paid 
directors are (i) independent of the activists, and (ii) even if they were 
dependent on the activists, they would be no more dependent on a 
particular shareholder than directors in other settings.  Finally, I argue that 
no harm would flow if these activist non-affiliated directors were in fact 
dependent on the activists. 
1. Activist-Paid Directors Are Independent of the Activists 
While initial instinct might lead one to think that supplemental pay to 
activist-nominees makes such nominees dependent on the activist, a closer 
examination reveals that the opposite is true.  It is the payment to the 
nominee, particularly if given in the form of performance-based pay that 
actually decouples the nominee and the activist’s interests, in cases where 
 
 125.  For the structure of the U.S. firm and the agency problem it entails, see ADOLF A. 
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(Macmillan Co. 1932); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).  For the role of the board in mitigating this issue, see, 
for example, MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 139–41 (Beard Books, 1976); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent 
Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1471 (2007).  See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 155 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2008) 
(detailing the emergence of the monitoring structure over the last few decades). 
 126.  In a controlling shareholder situation, it becomes important that some directors will 
be independent from the controlling shareholder, as the agency concern shifts from 
managers vs. shareholders concern to minority shareholders vs. controlling shareholder 
concern.  See, e.g., Kobi Kastiel, Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies, 90 IND. 
L.J. 1131, 1144 (2015) (arguing that controlling shareholders tend to overpay managers by 
expropriating funds from minority shareholders to maximize their private benefits due to 
their close social and business ties with managers). 
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the benefit of the company and the benefit of the activist diverge.  The 
compensation structure is set prior to the nominee’s election in what might 
be called a ‘fire and forget’ compensation package, which is not retrievable 
by the activist post-election.  And since such compensation is dependent on 
the company’s performance and not the activist’s performance, the 
nominee is actually incentivized to be independent of the activist in cases 
where the company and the activist’s interest diverge.  If the activist’s 
interests are for the company to adopt policy X, since it will improve its 
value in other holdings but it will come at the expense of the profits of the 
company, it will be in the best interest of the director to ignore the activist’s 
plan and adopt policy Y that would maximize the firm value and hence the 
director’s own pay. 
Of course, some will contend that even if it is in the activist-nominee’s 
best interest to maximize the company’s value in the short term, the 
nominee will approach it as a repeat-player, looking at the impact such 
decision will have on its long-term prospects.  In particular, the nominee 
would know that the activist won’t use her next time if the director acts 
independently; thus, the director will sacrifice the short term goals to 
maximize its long term prospects, the argument goes.  However, this 
argument is not persuasive on several fronts.  First, the type of activist-
nominees that receives the supplemental pay are people that typically have 
ample other opportunities, which is why such compensation was needed to 
begin with, and, unlike professional directors they are not hoping to make a 
good living by getting appointed by CEOs to public company boards.  This 
casts doubt that the nominee will approach her position as a repeat-game 
scenario.  Second, to the extent the pay package is sufficiently large, the 
director is likely to focus on maximizing her pay in the current position, 
even if she knows that would reduce her likelihood to be appointed again.  
Third, most of these activist-nominees possess specific attributes that are 
germane to the specific company the activist is targeting.  Since most 
activists target a variety of companies (where most of them will not suit the 
activist-nominee skill set), and launch a very small number of proxy fights 
each year, the likelihood of being reappointed by the same activist is not 
high to begin with,127 making the repeat-player concern more of a 
hypothetical argument. 
Even if we accept the contention that the pay given to activist-
nominees creates some level of dependence, behavioral or rational,128 the 
 
 127.  Activist hedge funds rarely appoint the same “outside nominees” to multiple 
companies for other reasons (specialty, independence), which makes this an even more 
remote concern.  
 128.  See J. Robert Brown Jr., The Myth of Director Independence Under Delaware 
Law: The Payment of $376,733 Does Not Result in a Loss of Director Independence, 
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fact of the matter is that these activist-nominees are just as independent as, 
if not more independent than, the “regular” so-called independent directors, 
who owe their seat to, and feel loyal to, the CEO.129  In that respect, one 
should ask whether we should be more concerned with independence from 
management or from a shareholder.  Since shareholders most often share 
the same goal, having a director more concerned with shareholders’ needs, 
even if focused on a particular shareholder, would likely be the better 
outcome than if such director preferred the needs of management, to whom 
the director was beholden.  Finally, even looking at the monetary 
dependence of the directors, it is not clear that the supplemental pay poses 
a greater issue than the regular pay, and other perks directors receive, 
which these directors wish to maintain for a longer duration.  There are 
many cases where incumbent directors are showered with perks and cash in 
exchange for giving CEOs generous compensation packages.130 
2. Activist-Paid Directors are More Independent than Activists 
themselves 
Even in the specific case of activist nominees, non-affiliated director 
independence is actually the easier scenario.  In many engagements of 
activists with target companies, the activists themselves are elected as 
board members, either via election as part of a proxy fight or as part of a 
negotiated standstill agreement.  For instance, Mr. Ackman, the head of 
Pershing Square Capital Management, and Steven Roth, the chairman of 
Vornado Realty Trust, were appointed as independent board members of 
J.C. Penney, months after the two investors disclosed major stakes in the 
company.131 Similarly, ValueAct President G. Mason Morfit joined 
 
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Apr. 25, 2011, 6:00 AM) 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/independent-directors/the-myth-of-director-
independence-under-delaware-law-the-pay.html [perma.cc/Q5VX-AJJX] (“[T]reating at 
least some of these directors as guardians of the interests of shareholders is at best 
misguided and at worst misleading.”). For an examination of the regulatory landscape, see 
Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of 
Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 
399–403 (2005), which details Delaware and federal treatment of fees.  
 129.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 122 (noting that under the official model of 
executive compensation, executives have control over their own pay whether the directors 
are independent or not). 
 130.  See Ichan, supra note 70 (describing mutually beneficial arrangements between 
boards and management that provided perks to non-employee directors such as “private 
planes, box seats at premier sporting events, country club memberships, re-pricing of 
underwater stock options, tax gross-ups and . . . massive cash payments,” while CEOs made 
1,000 times the wages of the average worker). 
 131.  See Michael J. de la Merced, 2 Big Investors Get Their Say at J.C. Penney, N.Y. 
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Microsoft’s board of directors in 2014 after the hedge fund took a $2 
billion position in the company.132  These directors, often the heads of the 
activist in flesh and blood, are treated by the company, and by stock 
exchanges rules, as independent board members despite being the 
shareholder itself and not a mere paid third party. 
3. There Are Many Similar Arrangements Throughout Corporate 
America Where Directors Are Generally Considered Independent 
Even Though They Are Less Independent Than Activist-Paid 
Directors 
While supplemental pay packages and high-profile activists may 
attract a higher level of initial concern regarding the activist-nominees and 
their independence, in reality there are numerous cases throughout the U.S. 
public market’s landscape where directors with more significant ties to 
shareholders are considered independent. 
 
Controlling shareholder 
First, many public companies have a controlling shareholder.133  In 
these companies the controlling shareholder has direct influence on the 
board’s composition, and the board members may be directors who have 
financial and social ties to the controller.  Despite these significant ties, 
Delaware courts have provided such directors with a presumption of 
independence, stating, “[m]erely because a director is nominated and 
elected by a large or controlling stockholder does not mean that he is 
necessarily beholden to his initial sponsor.”134  More so, Delaware courts 
have refused to recognize the nomination power of a controlling 
 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 24, 2011, 8:51 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/2-big-
investors-get-their-say-at-j-c-penney/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [perma.cc/G88C-
ECEJ] (documenting the process through which Ackerman and Roth joined J.C. Penney’s 
board). 
 132.  See Vardi, supra note 34 (reporting on how ValueAct forcing its way onto 
Microsoft’s board despite owning only 0.8% of Microsoft).  
 133.  See generally Kastiel, supra note 126 (discussing the role of controlling 
shareholders and their relationship with management). 
 134.  Frank v. Elgamal, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 37, at *70 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2014); see 
also Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 648-49 (Del. 2014) (“To show that a 
director is not independent, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the director is ‘beholden’ to the 
controlling party ‘or so under [the controller’s] influence that [the director’s] discretion 
would be sterilized.’”) (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 805, 936 (Del. 1993)).  Thus, 
to establish a lack of independence in the context of controlled company, a plaintiff meets 
his burden by showing that the directors are either beholden to the controlling shareholder or 
so under its influence that their discretion is sterilized. 
ARTICLE 5_NILI 2-15.DOCX 5 (NILI) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:47 PM 
552 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
shareholder as refuting the presumption of independence,135 declaring that 
the fact that a company’s executive chairman or a large shareholder played 
some role in the nomination process shall not, without additional evidence, 
automatically foreclose a director’s potential independence.136  
Accordingly, Delaware courts have declared that the fact that a 47 percent 
stockholder personally selected all of the directors of the corporation was 
not sufficient to establish that the stockholder dominated and controlled the 
corporation’s board of directors.137 
Specifically in the context of financial payments, and consistent with 
the overarching requirement that any disqualifying tie would be material, 
the simple fact that there are some financial ties between the interested 
party and the director is not disqualifying under Delaware law.  Rather, the 
question is whether those ties are material, in the sense that the alleged ties 
could have affected the impartiality of the director.138  Wachtell, the law 
firm leading the charge against supplemental pay to activist-nominees, 
actually applauded139 this decision, even though the court concluded that 
 
 135.  See Khanna v. McMinn, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *57 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2006) 
(“‘Directors must be nominated and elected to the board in one fashion or another’ and to 
hold otherwise would unnecessarily subject the independence of many corporate directors to 
doubt.”) (quoting In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 82 (Del. Ch. 
May 22, 2000)). 
 136.  See In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 82, at *54 (Del. 
Ch. May 22, 2000) (“Although independent nominating committees may indeed have a 
salutary effect on board efficacy and independence, and are surely a ‘best practice’ which 
the corporate governance community endorses, they are not a sine qua non for director 
independence under Delaware law.”)  
 137.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984) (holding that the fact that an 
individual owned 47% of a company’s stock and personally selected the directors did not 
mean the directors were not independent); see also Andreae v. Andreae, 1992 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 44, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3 1992) (noting that Delaware courts have consistently 
rejected the notion that a director cannot act independently of the entity that appointed him 
or her to the board). 
 138.  See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 509-13 (Del. Ch. 2013) (stating that 
financial ties are to be examined through the context of their meaning for both the 
shareholder and the director, that a $100,000 fee was not deemed to affect the independence 
of such director, and that “[the] plaintiffs have not put forth any evidence that tends to show 
that the $200,000 fee paid to Dinh’s firm was material to Dinh personally, given his roles at 
both Georgetown and Bancroft”); see also In re Freeport-McMoran Sulphur, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 2001 WL 50203, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2001) (finding that a consulting fee of 
$230,000, increased to $330,000 after the merger, did not cast doubt on a director’s 
independence, where the plaintiffs had not alleged that the fee was material to the director); 
In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 360 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part on other grounds sub nom.; Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (finding that 
legal and consulting fees of $175,000 paid by Disney to Senator George Mitchell and his 
law firm did not cast doubt on his independence, where the plaintiffs had not alleged that the 
fees were material to Mitchell).  
 139. Theodore N. Mirivs et al., Wachtell on Controlling Shareholders and the Business 
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the three directors were independent despite the financial fees they received 
from the controlling shareholder. 
 
“Constituency” Directors 
“Constituency” directors, i.e., directors who have ties to a major 
shareholder, investor or other interested party are extremely prevalent in 
the U.S.  The practice of awarding board representation to significant 
shareholders, V.C. firms and other interested stakeholders is not new and is 
commonplace in many of the major corporations in the U.S.  For instance 
Berkshire Hathaway, who is a major shareholder in Coca-Cola Company, 
has Howard G. Buffett, Warren Buffet’s son, as an independent director on 
Coca-Cola’s board.140  Similarly, Venture Capital firms often have their 
partners sit on boards of public companies that they have backed through 
the IPO process,141 while they still hold an equity portion (at times very 
significant) in the corporation.  These VC appointed directors are 
considered independent even though the VC firms appoint them and in 
many cases the directors are partners in the VC firms themselves.  For 
instance, Castlight Health, which went public in March 2013 and has a 
market cap of $1.26B, has five “independent” VC partners on its board.142  
Twitter has a partner of a VC firm that holds 5.35% of its shares on its 
board.143  Similar VC representation can be found in many of the recent 
large VC-backed IPOs such as: Zulily, Yelp, A10 Networks, Tableau 
Software and FireEye Inc.144  If a concern truly exists regarding the 
independence of board members who were appointed by shareholders, 
cases where the nominees are the shareholders themselves, particularly in 
the case of VC firms on the verge of exit, should be at the top of the list. 
 




 140.  Board of Directors: Howard G. Buffett, COCA-COLA, http://www.coca-
colacompany.com/our-company/board-of-directors-howard-g-buffett/ [perma.cc/3NYB-
A7AU] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 141.  See Brian Broughman and Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the 
Sale of VC-backed Firms, 95 J. OF FIN. ECON 384, 386 (2010) (showing that similar 
representation can be found in private companies with VC Directors). 
 142.  Dr. Bryan E. Roberts (Chairman) and Dr. Robert (Bob) Kocher from Venrock 
(20% SH); Ann (Annie) Huntress Lamont from Oak Investment Partners LP (12% SH); 
Christopher (Chris) P. Michel from Nautilus Ventures LLC; and David B. Singer from 
Maverick Capital Ltd. (P).  See data on file with author (containing information about 
venture capital representation on boards of directors).  
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
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4. And If Not Functionally Independent from the Activist, So What? 
Even if we assume that there is some dependency when activists 
nominate and pay their nominees, that these directors are not functionally 
independent from the activist, and we, despite the prevailing law and stock 
exchange regulations,145 would like to treat these directors as non-
independent directors (despite them being considered independent by the 
letter of the law), a compelling case can be made that these classifications 
as independent/non-independent would change nothing in the way 
shareholder interests, and the company interests, are protected. 
First, since in these cases of paid activist-nominees the concerns raised 
are not regarding potential deals that are not at arms-length with the activist 
or any other side deals with the activist, but rather regarding the direction 
of the company, the independence of these directors from the activist 
should not matter.  Of course, in cases in which side deals are involved, 
current laws146 would probably prohibit these directors from voting 
anyway. 
Second, and more importantly, these activist-nominees often 
constitute the minority of the board, as in most proxy fights the activist’s 
slate is a short one, attempting to gain some presence on the board, but not 
total control.147  As a minority, even if we assume the worst of intentions, 
these directors would still need to convince enough of their peers to gain 
majority.  Assuming the actions that concern Wachtell and others, are ones 
that allegedly clearly benefit the activist and are at the expense of the firm 
and other shareholders, such persuasion would be extremely unlikely. 
Third, if the concern of the opponents of supplemental pay is that the 
 
 145.  See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 303A  (2012), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4
&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F [perma.cc/7DNK-UUS5]  
(reciting the NYSE rules related to corporate governance standards, including director 
independence); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director 
Independence Listing Standards (UCLA Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 02-15, 2002), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=317121 [perma.cc/975G-
AMV9] (critiquing the NYSE standards provisions related to director independence). 
 146.  Since the directors would stand to gain directly from these deals, they would be 
considered non-independent for these matters.  See supra note 134 (discussing what is 
generally necessary to demonstrate a lack of independence in a controlled company). 
 147.  However, in some instances the activist does try to gain total control.  See, e.g., 
Jana Offers Its Plan to Help Revive CNET, supra note 46 (showing activists trying to gain 
control of a board).  In a recent development activist hedge fund Pershing Square went even 
further, joining forces with a strategic buyer in an attempt to take over Allergan.  Brian 
Solomon, Billionaire Bill Ackman, Valeant Want To Take Over Botox-Maker Allergan, 
FORBES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/04/21/billionaire-
bill-ackman-valeant-want-to-takeover-botox-maker-allergan/ [perma.cc/LKF2-KGG7]. 
ARTICLE 5_NILI 2-15.DOCX (NILI) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:47 PM 
2016] SERVANTS OF TWO MASTERS? 555 
 
activist-nominees are financially tied to the activist even after they are 
elected,148 then this concern could be easily removed in future 
engagements.  Since the activist’s relationship with its nominee is 
contractual and since the payment is made in cash and not in stock or 
equity in the activist, it is simple enough for the activist to insert an 
assumption provision in the agreement allowing the company to assume 
such payment if the nominee is elected.  This would give shareholders a 
choice both as to whether they think the nominee is better qualified than the 
incumbent directors as well as to whether there is a concern of 
independence that merits the assumption of the payment by the company. 
Finally, Delaware law, with its well-developed framework of fiduciary 
law, similarly reduces the concern that an activist-paid director would harm 
shareholders even if not truly independent of the activist.  Delaware law 
has long lasting framework that deals with directors whose independence 
from a shareholder might be in question.  The basic framework of 
Delaware law is that all directors owe their fiduciary duty to the 
corporation and to shareholders as a whole and that failure to do so would 
represent a breach of their duty of care or duty of loyalty,149 as the duty of 
designated directors is to the corporation and its stockholders, not to the 
particular designator.150  While the question of what would amount to a 
breach of a duty in such cases is often murky,151 and director’s actual risk 
 
 148.  It is important to note that all activist nominees have been long receiving a front 
sum of $50,000 for their trouble–this has not raised the outcry of the opponents of 
supplemental pay.  See Activist Investing, supra note 42 (noting the prevalence of 
supplemental pay for activist nominees). 
 149.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Cox Commc’n, 2006 WL 1586375, at *4 n.49 (Del. Ch. 
June 5, 2006) (“[A]s directors. . . the individual defendants owed fiduciary duties to the 
company”); FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JOSEPH FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 4.16[E][2] (3d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2008) 
(“The duties of directors designated by large stockholders are clear: under Weinberger, they 
still owe the corporation and its shareholders ‘an uncompromising duty of loyalty’”); 
EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW TUREZYN & ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE 
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, § 141.2.1.7 (5d ed. 2013) (“[T]he law does not recognize a 
special duty on the part of directors elected by a special class to the class electing them. 
Rather, the law demands directors’ fidelity toward the corporation and all its 
shareholders.”).  See generally Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many 
Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 
BUS. LAW. 761 (2008) (asserting existing standards of liability for breach of fiduciary duty 
are sufficient to account for directors who seemingly represent a particular constituency of a 
corporation). 
 150.  See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 149, at § 4.38(B) (noting that the duty of 
designated directors lies with the corporation). 
 151.  See Cyril Moscow, Corporate Governance: The Representative Director Problem, 
16 INSIGHTS no. 6, 12, 12 (June 2002), 
http://www.honigman.com/media/site_files/456_imgimgMoscow.pdf [perma.cc/KR4D-
AZW5] (indicating that the dearth of case law and literature addressing the unique position 
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of liability might be called into question,152 it is nevertheless a factor that 
could curb the risk of sacrificing shareholder interests to the benefit of the 
activist. 
Ironically, Wachtell, who now loudly criticizes the independence of 
activist-paid directors and their ability to serve all shareholders, has been a 
vocal advocate of directors’ ability to serve all shareholders and the 
effectiveness of their fiduciary duties in other contexts, particularly when 
their independence from management, rather than an activist, was 
questioned.153  If Wachtell truly believes that “public company directors are 
acutely aware of their fiduciary duties, to shareholders and others, and 
work hard to meet them[,]”154 then it should not matter if the concern is 
their independence from management or from an activist shareholder. 
B. Reduced Board “Cohesiveness” 
Critics often claim that activist-paid directors will make boards less 
cohesive.155  The loss of “cohesiveness” and fragmentation of the board 
 
of representative directors can result in the “unnecessary separation of legal doctrine from 
corporate activity that can create confusion, expense and possible liability”). 
 152.  See generally Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1055 (2006) (discussing the limited personal liability exposure outside directors face). 
 153.  See Lipton & Savitt, supra note 24, at 751 (“[T]o the contrary, our experience 
indicates that public company directors are acutely aware of their fiduciary duties, to 
shareholders and others, and work hard to meet them. Moreover, to the extent directors can 
be shown to ‘divert corporate resources’ or resist ‘value-increasing changes,’ they would 
clearly be subject to liability under current law.”). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  See Lipton et al., supra note 124, at 1 (asserting that the special compensation 
arrangements offered by activist investors threaten by misaligning the ultimate interests of 
activist-paid directors, those of the other directors, and those of the shareholder).  A close-
knit board could be beneficial by increasing trust and openness between board members.  
See John F. Olson & Michael T. Adams, Composing a Balanced and Effective Board To 
Meet New Governance Mandates, 59 BUS. LAW. 421, 445–46 (2004) (suggesting that shared 
interests promote honest dialogue and constructive criticism within a group); James D. 
Westpahl & Edward J. Zajac, Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, 
Reciprocity and the Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations, 42 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 161, 163–64 (1997) (citing social psychological research that demonstrates high levels of 
group cohesion facilitate cooperative behavior among group members).  However, these 
benefits do come with a price tag of decreased independence and of increased difficulty in 
impartially assessing another director’s work.  See Victor Brudney, The Independent 
Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 612-13 (1982) 
(indicating that independent directors are not required to forgo social friendships, or even 
membership, in the group whose actions they are asked to assess); Marleen A. O’Connor, 
The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1256-57 (2003) 
(suggesting that groups create a shared perception, which may not be accurate, simply 
because some members in the group possesses a particular view).  Moreover, a close-knit 
board could create a tendency to avoid conflict, even when conflict may yield beneficial 
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would damage the board’s effectiveness, the argument goes.  Nonetheless, 
even if true, the introduction of activist-paid directors might be a good 
thing, as activists most often target firms that perform poorly,156 where the 
problem is more likely to be that the board is too cohesive, preventing it 
from being effective and from taking the hard steps necessary to improve 
firm performance.157  Second, even in cases where activist intervention is in 
the better-performing companies or in well-functioning boards, studies 
have shown that lack of cohesiveness might actually contribute to company 
and board performance.158  Third, supplemental pay might actually serve as 
a way to smooth the financial interests between the incoming directors and 
the more tenured directors.  Specifically, front-loading the financial 
interests of the activist nominees is more likely to bring them closer to the 
financial interests of the rest of the board, and not the other way around.  
 
strategic changes, if such action would undermine the friendship one has formed.  See Karen 
A. Jehn & Priti Pradhan Shah, Interpersonal Relationships and Task Performance: An 
Examination of Mediating Processes in Friendship and Acquaintance Groups, 72 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 775, 786 (1997) (examining behavior in different groups); 
Janine Nahapiet & Sumantra Ghoshal, Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the 
Organizational Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 242, 244-45 (1998) (identifying that the 
social capital inherent in friendships and obligations encourages cooperative behavior but 
reduces confrontation); Reed E. Nelson, The Strength of Strong Ties: Social Networks and 
Intergroup Conflict in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 377, 396-97 (1989) (finding 
generally that strong ties between groups are typical in low-conflict organizations).  See also 
Jerry Goodstein & Warren Boeker, Turbulence at the Top: A New Perspective on 
Governance Structure Changes and Strategic Change, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 306, 313 (1991) 
(suggesting that the longer the members of a board of directors have worked together, the 
more likely they are to resist change). 
 156.  A SharkRepellent study shows that underperformers are three times more likely 
than outperformers to be targeted by activists.  See Adam Kommel, SharkRepellent study 
shows underperformers three times more likely to be targeted by activists than 
outperformers, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (Dec. 16, 2013), 
https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=undefined&pg=/pub/rs_2013121
6.html&rnd=975479 [perma.cc/6ZMS-9UA8] (finding that out of the 1,123 activist targets 
in the study, 70.3% underperformed the Russell 3000 by at least ten percentage points 
whereas only 21.5% of activist targets outperformed by more than ten percentage points).  
 157.  See Charles J. Cuny & Eli Talmor, A Theory of Private Equity Turnarounds, 13 J. 
CORP. FIN. 629, 638 (2007) (discussing the hurdles that the corporation might encounter 
during an internal effort to enact a turnaround and finding that under board process, the 
board may be unable or unwilling to recognize its own failings). 
 158.  See supra note 155 and accompanying text (examining board cohesiveness).  See 
also Khaled Elsayed, Board Size and Corporate Performance: The Missing Role of Board 
Leadership Structure, 15 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 415, 423 (2011) (discussing the impact 
CEO-Chairman duality has on board effectiveness and how cohesiveness can cause 
independent directors to exit the game of monitoring altogether); Daniel P. Forbes & 
Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of 
Directors as Strategic Decision-making Groups, 24 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 489, 496 (1999) 
(suggesting that very high levels of cohesiveness are likely to prove detrimental to the 
quality of the board’s decision making). 
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Thus, to the extent financial stake has an impact on cohesiveness, 
supplemental pay actually serves as a smoothing factor rather than 
diverging one. 
Fourth, and most importantly, the argument that paid activist-
nominees will reduce board cohesiveness assumes that such cohesiveness 
already exists on companies’ boards, and that the cohesiveness is 
dependent on the directors being elected as part of one slate and with 
similar financial incentives.  In reality, however, these assumptions are far 
from portraying an accurate representation of how boards are comprised. 
1. Boards Already Have Shareholder-Affiliated/Nominated Directors 
A fundamental part of the above-mentioned argument regarding board 
cohesiveness is the underlying claim that boards already possess a 
cohesiveness stemming from their election as one unit, organized by the 
company to produce a ‘whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ structure.  
That claim, while appealing on its face, portrays a reality that is no longer 
accurate, or that may very well never have existed in many companies. 
As detailed above, “constituency” directors, i.e., directors who have 
ties to a major shareholder, investor, or other interested party, are 
extremely prevalent in the U.S.159  The practice of awarding board 
representation to significant shareholders, venture capital firms and other 
interested stakeholders is not new and is commonplace in many of the 
major corporations in the U.S.  Activist investors often demand, and 
receive, board representation in their companies as part of an agreement 
with incumbent management.  Similarly, venture capital firms often have 
their partners sit on boards of public companies they have backed through 
the IPO process while they still hold equity portions (at times, very 
significant ones) in the corporation.  Private equity firms have similarly 
sought board representation in their public holdings.  Finally, controlled 
companies present another example of a board that may contain different 
factions of members with diverging interests, as the controlling shareholder 
may appoint the majority of directors while minority shareholders are still 
able to gain board representation through cumulative voting, or otherwise. 
In sum, while many companies have a board that is fully supported by 
management, many other companies have a board composition that does 
not follow the narrative of the pre-designed cohesive board composition.  
Moreover, the assumption that board cohesiveness is dependent on the 
circumstances by which a director earned her seat, rather than on her social 
 
 159.  See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text (discussing venture capital 
representation on boards of directors).   
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and professional background, merits more intense scrutiny.160 
2. Even Management-Nominated, Non Shareholder-Affiliated 
Directors Have Diverse Interests 
A second weakness in the argument that board cohesiveness would be 
thwarted by the insertion of financial motives into the boardroom in the 
form of activist-affiliated nominees with supplemental pay is that a variety 
of different motives, financial and others, already exist in the boardroom 
even without the activist nominees.  In that sense, to the extent board 
cohesiveness exists and is important to the function of the board,161 the 
insertion of an additional set of financial motivations of an activist nominee 
should not change much.  As this Article further details below, the attempt 
to pigeon-hole board cohesiveness into stemming from the fixed 
compensation granted by the company or from its election as one unit 
seems to disregard the inherent diversity of the board itself.  Not all 
directors are created equal, even without the activists’ presence.  Some 
directors are more tenured than others, some are employees while others 
are not, and some serve on other boards while some do not. 
 
Director Tenure 
Almost every company’s board has some variance in its members’ 
tenure.162  Some directors have served for many years on the board while 
others were just recently appointed.  Some directors expect to retire soon 
while others are hoping to stay for many more years.  No board is identical 
to each other and no board stays the same over time.  The variance in 
tenure, important in and of itself,163 has a direct impact on director motives.  
 
 160.  See generally Forbes & Milliken, supra note 158 (underscoring the need for further 
research on the link between board demographics, group dynamics, and corporate 
performance).  For a detailed analysis of group dynamics, what drives board effectiveness 
and what is important in board cohesiveness, see C. B. Ingley & N.T. van der Walt, Board 
Configuration: Building Better Boards, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE 5, 8 (2003), which cites intra-
board dynamics, constituency concentration, and diversity as relevant factors. 
 161.  See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 158, at 496 (identifying a curvilinear 
relationship between board cohesiveness and board task performance). 
 162.  See 2010 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX, supra note 95, at 16 and accompanying 
text regarding board tenure (identifying, for example, an average tenure length of 8.5 years 
but noting that 62% of boards have an average tenure between six and ten years and that 
21% of boards have an average tenure of eleven or more years). 
 163.  See Judy Canavan et al., Board Tenure: How Long is Too Long? 28 DIRECTORS & 
BOARDS-AM. EDITION 39, 41 (2004) (suggesting that long tenure can serve as a bottleneck 
on the mix of director talent and performance); Nikos Vafeas, Length of Board Tenure and 
Outside Director Independence, 30 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1043, 1062 (2003) (linking outside 
director tenure with variations in outside director affiliation, equity, reputation, and power 
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Some directors, with long tenure, tend to have a lot of stock in the 
company, while other directors are just starting to accumulate equity in the 
company.  Those directors who intend to retire soon might prefer to 
liquidate their position and exit; others are new on board and want to serve 
many years, and thus may be less sensitive to short term changes in share 
price but more sensitive to actions that might endanger their ability to serve 
on the board in the long-term. 
 
Insiders vs. Outsiders 
Even if we assume that all of the directors have the same tenure and 
similar expectations, the board itself, by practice and by regulation, is still 
divided into two factions: the “insiders” and the “outsiders.”  Most, if not 
all boards, have at least one company employee on the board, the CEO, and 
many companies have several other high-ranking employees on the 
board.164  The board members that are also employees of the company are 
considered “insiders,” as opposed to the independent directors that all 
public companies boards must also have.165  By virtue of being a company 
employee, the group of inside directors holds significantly differing 
motives than its independent counterpart.  As company employees, these 
directors stand to lose much more if certain changes to the company were 
to be taken, as their human capital is much less diversified (their 
employment), and the benefits they can extract from it might be at risk.166  
Additionally, employee-directors’ equity in the company is also 
significantly higher and different from the rest of the board as the 
employee-directors have both director compensation and executive 
 
as being affected by varying tenure lengths of outside directors); Sterling Huang, Zombie 
Boards: Board Tenure and Firm Performance 19 (July 29, 2013) (unpublished seminar 
paper, Singapore Management University – School of Accountancy) (on file with INSEAD 
Business School) (identifying board tenure effects on a firm’s M&A performance, financial 
reporting quality, compensation practices, CEO replacement decisions, and changes in 
strategic direction). 
 164.  According to a 2013 report, 40% of the S&P 500 had at least one additional 
employee, besides the CEO, on their respective boards.  Cf. 2013 SPENCER STUART BOARD 
INDEX, supra note 95, at 12 (“On 60% of boards today, the CEO is the only non-
independent director. . . .”). 
 165.  See Standards Relating to Listed Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,789-
90 (April 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, and 274) (requiring 
the independence of each member of public company audit committees, which are 
composed of members of the board of directors).  See also Annemarie K. Keinath & Judith 
C. Walo, Audit Committee Responsibilities, 74 CPA J. 22, 23 (2004) (indicating that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes heightened independence requirements on the members of the 
audit committee). 
 166.  See Cuny & Talmor, supra note 157, at 632 (suggesting that a managerial process 
runs the risk of the manager offering misleading or incorrect information because of the 
impact of such a role on the probability of her job being terminated). 
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compensation packages to consider.  This division in risk tolerance and 
financial incentives carries with it similar division of motives. 
 
Connectedness to CEO 
Connectedness to the CEO might also impact a director’s set of 
motives and could create disparity between different board members.167  
Connectedness to the CEO relies on norms of reciprocity, liking, and social 
consensus to shape group decision-making processes and increases the 
CEO’s social influence.168  The CEO connectedness could be appointment-
based or social-based.  Appointment-based CEO connectedness manifests 
when directors are appointed during the current CEO’s tenure.  When more 
directors are appointed during a CEO’s tenure, the CEO’s social influence 
increases because CEOs are involved, directly, or indirectly through 
consultation with the nominating committee, in recruiting, nominating, and 
appointing of the directors; those directors are more likely to “share similar 
beliefs, priorities, and visions with, and may be beholden to, the CEO who 
appoints them,”169 more so than directors appointed during a previous 
CEO’s tenure.170  CEO connectedness based on sharing prior education, 
employment, or social network ties with directors could also play a factor 




Directors also diverge in their financial motives based on their equity 
ownership and exposure, even when tenure is held constant.  Since some 
 
 167.  See Vikramaditya S. Khanna et al., CEO Connectedness and Corporate Frauds, 70 
J. FIN. 1203, 1204-05 (2015) (finding that appointment-based connectedness weakens the 
checks and balances required for prevention of corporate fraud because directors appointed 
by the CEO are more likely to share with that CEO similar beliefs and visions, as opposed to 
directors not appointed by that same CEO); E. Han Kim & Yao Lu, The Independent Board 
Requirement and CEO Connectedness 3 (Dec. 8, 2011) (unpublished paper, University of 
Michigan and Tsinghua University) (on file with University of Michigan) (suggesting that 
newly appointed directors may be beholden to the CEO who appoints them, while directors 
appointed by a previous CEO are more likely to challenge a new CEO).  
 168.  See generally Robert B. Cialdini, Principles of Automatic Influence, in PERSONAL 
INFLUENCE: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 1, 9-19 (Jacob Jacoby & c. Samuel Craig, 
eds.) (1984) (asserting that one can subtly gain the compliance of others through triggering 
various stimuli such as social validation, authority, reciprocity, and friendship). 
 169.  Kim & Lu, supra note 167, at 3. 
 170.  See Jeffrey L. Coles et al., Co-opted Boards, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 1751, 1753 (2014) 
(finding that sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance decreases and CEO pay levels 
increase as a result of an increase of CEO appointed-directors on the board); Adair Morse et 
al., Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? 66 J. OF FIN. 1779, 1779 (2011) 
(arguing that a CEO can directly and indirectly influence the board to slant her performance 
assessment toward better performing measures). 
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directors choose to hold their stock longer than the required period of 
restriction, and some directors are more diversified than others in their 
overall equity portfolio, it stands that their financial motives and risk 
aversion would vary based on their equity holdings.  Since directors make 
changes to their stock ownership, these interests are constantly changing. 
 
Serving on Different Committees or Differential Pay 
So far, an assumption has been made that director pay is fixed and is 
identical for all board members.  In reality, however, even without 
supplemental pay, directors are paid in a differential manner—leading to 
different pay to otherwise similar directors.  These different levels of pay 
can stem from different functions the director serves171 (i.e., whether they 
are on the audit committee, serve as the chair, etc.) but also can be because 
of personal choice as to the portion of payment received in equity, the 
equity holdings in the company, and whether the company provides initial 
substantial equity grants.172 
 
Sitting on Other Boards and Other Engagements 
A related point stems not from the director’s incentives or pay from 
the company, but rather from each director’s external set of incentives: 
specifically, if some directors serve on numerous boards, they might be 
more inclined to take risk as their human capital might be better diversified.  
However, a director whose only appointment is with the company might be 
more reluctant to endanger it, all other things held equal.  Similarly, each 
director’s background, stature and other outside sources of income all have 
a bearing on the motives she brings to the position. 
All of the above serves to illustrate the complexity of directors’ 
motives and the myriad of motives already in place on public companies’ 
boards.  While supplemental pay to directors might add an additional 
motive to the board, it is not different than the many pre-existing factors 
 
 171.  Many boards have specific additional pay for membership in one of the board 
committees, in particular the audit committee.  See 2012 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX, 
supra note 95, at 40 and accompanying text (reporting in 2012 an average retainer of 
$11,503 for audit committee members, which is 40% higher than the average amount paid to 
members of other committees). 
 172.  For instance, Adobe requires each non-employee director to hold 25% of the net 
shares acquired from Adobe until the total number of shares held by such non-employee 
director equals or exceeds 6,000 shares and provides an initial grant of RSUs in an amount 
valued at $450,000 at the time of election.  This grant provides variance in the equity 
compensation in a given year between incumbent and newly elected directors.  Adobe Sys. 
Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 88-90 (March 1, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634313000024/adbedef14a2013.ht
m [perma.cc/3LAE-JDDQ]. 
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that create and comprise each director’s motives. 
C. Short-Term Incentives 
While the first two concerns, lack of independence and loss of 
cohesiveness, touch on the nominees’ attributes and impact on the board’s 
work in general, a third concern often raised by opponents of supplemental 
pay revolves around the interplay between short- and long-term company 
performance.  Opponents of activism by hedge funds often cite the modus-
operandi of activist hedge funds as a strategy aiming to gain short term 
profits at the expense of long-term performance.  Against this backdrop, the 
concern attributed to the structure of the activist nominees’ supplemental 
pay is that it would drive the directors to be more short-term-oriented, even 
if it is not the best long-term approach because of the short-term structure 
of the supplemental compensation of these activist-nominees. 
Indeed short-termism has been a hot topic,173 and to a certain extent it 
might present a corporate governance concern,174 but there is little reason to 
believe that short-termism, even if an issue, will be exacerbated due to the 
presence of activist nominees and their compensation structure.  As further 
detailed below, there are several reasons that should alleviate the concern 
regarding corporate short-termism in this context. 
 
 173.  For a summary review of the debate and public attention this debate has generated, 
see Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 723-24. 
 174.  See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 24, at 674 n.77 (citing a projection of 
governance incoherence alongside shareholder empowerment that will impose a short-term 
horizon with harmful effects); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, The Big Idea-What Good Are 
Shareholders?, 48 HARV. BUS. REV. 49, 51 (2012) (proposing that improving corporate 
governance in light of short-termism will require separating patient shareholders from short-
term traders); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We 
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates 
Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 26 (2010) (expressing corporate concerns 
with respect to short-termism); Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not Long-Term 
Value, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-term-gain-not-long-term-value 
[perma.cc/JUN2-EBH6] (suggesting that corporate leaders should focus on creating long-
term competitive advantage to sustain growth instead of simply trying to meet the short-
term numbers); JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM 
DECISION MAKING 9 (2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/bis-
12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf [perma.cc/F5ZV-PTDR] (identifying 
short-termism as a problem in UK markets and proposing a solution that includes 
establishing best practices for key players, including company directors); Martin Lipton, 
Important Questions About Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/09/important-
questions-about-activist-hedge-funds [perma.cc/79XX-KME2] (identifying as a critical 
question whether “best practices” corporate governance is a major factor in short-termism).  
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1. Activist-Paid directors can only act if they convince other 
directors 
As discussed above, since activist-paid directors are most often a 
minority group in the boardroom, their ability to steer the corporation into 
short-termism is limited since they would have to gain the support of some 
other, management nominated directors who are not paid for short-term 
performance and who would like to have a long tenure at the company 
(which could be compromised if they act in short-termism).  Assuming 
these actions are clearly short-term driven,175 the board is unlikely to adopt 
them even if the activist nominees are pushing for them. 
2. There is no evidence that focus on the short-term hurts long-term 
A key component of the argument regarding short-termism is 
attributing hedge fund activism with short-termism.  While it is true that 
activists usually do not stay in companies for the long term, there is no 
evidence that their actions and the changes that they advocate for in the 
short term actually hurt the target’s long-term performance.  To the 
contrary, several studies have found the opposite: that activism not only 
improves short term returns and performance but that such improvement 
continues into the long term, even after the activist has departed the 
company.176  If activists’ interventions and actions are good both in the 
short term and for the long term, structuring director pay as a function of 
returns in the short to intermediate term should not be so concerning, as it 
might have other legitimate motives.177 
3. Since boards have directors with far worse short term incentives, 
activist-paid nominees might actually be an improvement 
As noted above, public companies’ boards are already highly diverse 
in their members’ motives and incentives.  While the pay structure of 
activist nominees is often criticized for its focus on short-term return, in 
reality these activist nominees might have a longer horizon than some other 
members of the board.  For example, a board member who is about to 
 
 175.  It is important to note that it can be hard to discern short-termism from other 
actions that might raise both short- and long-term value.  
 176.  For a discussion of different views on short-term and long-term effects of 
shareholder activism, see generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, and supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
 177.  An activist may not want to pay the directors after it exits and no longer has a stake 
in the company.  A need also exists to induce short-term shocks as discussed infra Part 
V.C.4. 
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retire, or who has large amount of restricted stock that becomes 
unrestricted, might have a much stronger incentive to maximize the short 
term returns on the expense of the long term.  Similarly, CEOs and other 
executives might try to spring-load good news and engage in other short-
term behavior to maximize their options value.178  Lastly, if one is 
concerned with activists’ short term interests, it stands to reason that having 
the activists themselves on the board is an even worse option than having 
an outside nominee who is paid by the activist.  Assuming the activist gets 
a seat anyway, it might be preferable to have non-affiliated nominees who 
may earn their pay under more limited conditions and who have less skin in 
the game than the activist itself.  Against this backdrop, appointing non-
affiliated activist-paid directors might actually improve the board’s long 
term view and reduce the risk of short-termism, and not the other way 
around. 
4. In certain circumstances short-term incentives are good 
While normally, the long-term horizon is important and directors’ 
compensation structure should reflect it, activist hedge funds focus on a 
subset of target companies that might require short-term shocks.  Against 
the backdrop of long-term focus in the compensation plans of management 
and current directors, one might want an influx of short-term incentives to 
help drive and implement the necessary short term shock.  In this sense, in 
some cases having a few directors with short-term incentives might help 
balance out an overly conservative board. 
V. CHARTING ACTIVIST-NOMINEES PAY ARRANGEMENTS – KEY 
FACTORS TO CONSIDER 
So far, a strong case has been made that activist-paid directors do not 
justify the strong outcry that surrounds them, and given the current 
corporate governance landscape, they might actually pose a lesser concern 
than some of their fellow directors.  However, one still cannot completely 
ignore some of the concerns payments to activist-nominated directors may 
raise.  While as a whole activist-paid nominees may prove beneficial to 
shareholders, the specifics of these compensation arrangements are 
germane to establishing the level of concern one should have regarding 
 
 178.  Robert Daines et al., Right on Schedule: CEO Option Grants and Opportunism at 
42 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363148 (documenting 
negative abnormal returns before scheduled option grants and positive abnormal returns 
after the grants. These returns are explained by measures of a CEO’s incentive and ability to 
influence stock price). 
ARTICLE 5_NILI 2-15.DOCX 5 (NILI) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:47 PM 
566 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
their arrangements with the activist.  This Part delineates some of the key 
factors that could help shareholders, proxy advisors, and companies in 
assessing the true risk these payments may pose. 
In particular, it is important to use a three-layered approach to 
assessing any compensation arrangement between an activist and a 
potential nominee.  This approach should examine how likely the concerns 
regarding short-termism, lack of independence, and damage to board 
cohesiveness are to transpire given (a) the activist’s background and 
intentions, (b) the nominee’s background and history with the activist, and 
(c) the specifics of the compensation arrangements that were put in place.  
The evaluation of these three components and the interplay between them 
could help to establish a “safe-zone” or in raising “red flags” for 
shareholders’ consideration. 
A. The Activist 
Not all activists are made equal.  While all hedge funds are driven by 
value creation to their investors, their approach to their target companies, 
and the value to the long-term shareholders of these companies, differs 
greatly.  While some activists are truly interested in the long-term health 
and prosperity of the company, and evidence suggests this is most often the 
case,179in some cases the activist intends to generate profits on the expense 
of the target company, either by spiking short-term returns at the expense 
of long-term prosperity, by engaging in financial manipulation, or by 
empty voting due to conflict of interests.180  Therefore, it is imperative to 
key-in on some of the main factors that could provide shareholders a better 
gauge as to the activist’s true intentions for payments to its nominees. 
 
Full Disclosure of the Compensation Arrangement 
While this point might seem obvious, in reality activist hedge funds 
are not subject to the same disclosure rules as their targets, public 
corporations.  Since the playing field is tilted, it is extremely important to 
even it out as much as possible through the production of a full and 
complete disclosure of the compensation arrangements with the nominee. 
In most cases, the activists will disclose the agreements with their 
nominees in their proxy materials, since they have officially launched, or 
announced intent to launch, a proxy contest and are bound by the SEC 
 
 179.  See Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, at 711 (finding no evidence for the concerns of 
activist intervention).  
 180.  See Hu & Black, supra note 24, at 823 (discussing the mechanics of empty voting); 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1076 (describing empty voting as an example of the same 
conflicts of interest problem created by the separation of legal and beneficial ownership). 
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requirements.181  However, there are several instances where the activist 
might not be bound by these requirements, such as when the activist has 
reached an agreement with management prior to launching a proxy fight 
and before a filing of a 13D form, or before it made its intentions publicly 
known. 
Importantly, in some instances, the activist might disclose only the 
key details of the agreement without sharing the full form or even refrain 
from disclosing it at all.182  Since the details of any compensation 
arrangement are vital, lack of full disclosure of the executed agreement 
with the nominee, should, in itself, raise a red flag. 
 
Full Disclosure of Other Ties With the Nominee 
A second layer of information that could prove beneficial in assessing 
the activist’s intentions revolves around the relationship the nominee has, 
or has had, with the activist.  Did the nominee serve as a director on behalf 
of the activist in the past?  Does she receive other monetary compensation 
that is not directly related to the case in question such as consulting fees?  
Does she have an equity stake in the activist itself? 
 
The Time Horizon of the Activist: 
Many of the concerns regarding shareholder activists in general, and 
 
 181. The disclosure of these arrangements could occur as part of the reporting duties 
imposed when an activist crosses the 5% threshold, including the filing of Schedule 13D. 
 182.  Some believe that the current regulatory framework has too many loopholes that 
allow the activist to not disclose these arrangements if it wishes to do so, since there is no 
specific requirement under the current U.S. securities rules for the disclosure of all (i) 
compensatory arrangements between a board nominee and the nominating shareholder or 
(ii) conflicts of interest presented by compensatory arrangements between a nominee and a 
nominating shareholder. While Item 5 of Schedule 14A that governs proxy solicitations by 
an activist requires some disclosure regarding arrangements between a nominating group 
and the nominee, such disclosure requirements are not nearly as specific or prescriptive as 
the comprehensive disclosures required for compensation paid by an issuer to its officers 
and directors under Item 402 of Regulation S-K.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2015) 
(requiring brief descriptions of substantial direct or indirect interests by certain participants 
in the proxy contest); Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Inst. Investors, to 
Keith F. Higgins, Dir. of the Div. of Corporate Fin., U.S. SEC Re: Compensation 
Arrangements between Nominating Shareholders and Board Nominees at 4 (March 31, 
2014), 
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2014/03_31_14_CII_letter_to
_SEC.pdf [perma.cc/38QS-M3WT] (asserting that the disclosures required by Item 402 of 
Regulation S-K are more comprehensive than disclosures required by Item 5 of Schedule 
14A); see also Sabastian V. Niles, CII Urges SEC to Require Disclosure of Third-Party 
Director Compensation, THE HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REGULATION (May 14, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/05/14/cii-
urges-sec-to-require-disclosure-of-third-party-director-compensation/ [perma.cc/39VC-
KX4R] (agreeing with the CII’s concerns regarding the line-item disclosure requirements). 
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in the context of director nomination in particular, stem from their relative 
short-term positions in their target companies.183  Since the activist intends 
to exit in the short-term, a concern arises that the activist’s short-term 
interests might not align with the long-term benefit of the company.  While 
these concerns are largely unsubstantiated as an outlook of activists as a 
group, it is not possible to rule out cases in which the activist might try to 
reap short-term profits on the expense of long-term value.  In that context, 
the activist can alleviate shareholder’s concerns through two channels.  
First, it can structure the compensation arrangements with the nominee in a 
manner that would enhance the likelihood of long-term value creation, as 
detailed below.  Second, the activist can itself commit to hold the stock for 
a specified duration.  If the activist promises to hold stock in a positive net 
position throughout its proposed turnaround plan, shareholders can be more 
confident that the activist has the right incentives.  In this sense, there is a 
balance between the pay structure and the activists’ own time horizon. 
 
Activist History and Track Record: 
While the past does not guarantee the future, activists’ past 
engagements can inform shareholders of the activists’ methods and 
business models, and in turn, the level of concern their payments to 
nominees should raise.  Does the activist tend to seek confrontation with 
the existing board or does its appointment fit in seamlessly?  How long 
does the activist generally hold the share of its targets?  Does the activist 
focus on financial or operational changes?  Did the activist engage in 
payments in the past?  Were the payments to, and the profile of, the 
nominees necessary to the business model the activist seeks to promote?  
All of these questions could help in assessing the general level of scrutiny 
these pay arrangements should receive.184 
 
The Activist Proposed Business Plan and The Impact The Nominee 
Can Have In Fostering It: 
As discussed above, the compensation arrangement may be needed in 
order to allow the activist to attract the most suitable nominee.  If that is the 
 
 183.  Most activists exit their targets within 2-3 years.  See e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge 
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. OF FIN. 1729, 1749 
(2008) (reviewing the exiting process for hedge funds); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, 
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. OF 
FIN. 187, 220 (2009) (examining the effects short-term activist investors have on their target 
firms). 
 184.  For instance, one can contrast the business model and history of Value Act and 
Pershing Square. While Value Act focuses on a collaborative model with existing board and 
management, and usually holds its share for lengthy periods of time, Pershing Square is 
more focused on confrontational tactics attempting to gain control.   
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case, then it follows that the business plan and the nominee must have a 
clear linkage and that the payment is for the specific qualities the nominee 
possesses and not as a bonding arrangement with the activist. 
B. The Pay Design 
Similar to the activist, not all pay arrangements are created equal.  
Some might focus on cash, some on equity; some might require a holding 
period while some might not.  In assessing an activist-paid nominee’s 
candidacy, the pay design chosen by the activist is germane to an 
assessment of whether shareholders should be concerned.  In this context 
the pay design should specifically reduce the concerns that (a) the nominee 
would continue to be tied to the activist’s interests, even when in clash with 
those of the company, after her election and (b) that the pay structure does 
not encourage short-term value manipulation.  In doing so, shareholders 
should examine the structure of the payments, their duration and the timing 
and the total value of the compensation. 
 
Composition 
Similar to CEO and director compensation, the structure in which the 
payments are given is crucial to their evaluation.185  Among the factors that 
shareholders would need to weigh is whether the compensation is given in 
all cash or in equity (or the ratio of cash to equity).  As cash compensation 
increases, the concern is that the nominee would act to the benefit of the 
activist and not the company in conflicted scenarios.  If some of the 
compensation is given in equity and tied to performance, is it tied to the 
company’s performance or the activist’s performance?  If the compensation 
includes options, are they deeply out of the money, thus driving the director 
to take excessive risk or bump short term share price? 
 
Duration and Timing 
The duration and timing of the compensation are also important to the 
assessment of the risk of short-termism and lack of independence.  If the 
nominee receives the pay in one upfront payment, it might reduce its 
dependence on the activist. If, however, the pay is in several installments 
that are dependent on the activist’s judgment or performance, such 
dependence might be long-lasting.  If some of the compensation is given in 
 
 185.  See, e.g., INST. S’HOLDER SERV. INC., 2013 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY 
GUIDELINES 38, 41 (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/2013ISSUSSummaryGuidelines1312013.pdf 
[perma.cc/U8PF-UD9W] (enumerating the factors that should be considered when voting on 
Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute proposals). 
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equity is there a holding period that would ensure that the nominee would 
have the long-term interests of the company in mind?  Can the nominee sell 
its equity in the company prior or immediately after the departure of the 
activist or does it require a holding period that lasts beyond such point, 
minimizing the risk of timing the market?  Similarly important is the 
question of whether the compensation is front or back loaded.186 
Activists could easily structure the pay in a manner that is more long-
term oriented.  For instance, such pay could be based on a five-year period 
and not the three-year period that was previously offered.  Pay could be 
further delayed and given at some point after the director’s departure, or the 
activist could require the nominee to buy the target’s stock with the 
proceeds of the pay. 
 
Total value 
Equally important to the general design of the pay package is the 
assessment of the total potential value of the compensation.  In particular, 
shareholders would need to assess whether the pay is aimed at 
compensating the candidate for her willingness to endure the challenging 
process of a proxy fight or at reflecting a form of “loyalty-buying” by the 
activist. 
C. The Nominee and Her Clout Within the Board 
While the activist and the pay design form the first two legs of the 
evaluation-triangle, the nominee and her estimated clout in the board are 
equally important.  Assuming shareholders approve of the activist’s agenda 
but are concerned that a paid director might eventually sacrifice 
shareholders’ interests, their assessment of the tradeoff between the risks of 
such pay and the benefits of the candidate and the plan cannot be done in a 
void.  The nominee’s own stature and record, as well as her relative 
position in the board if elected, are also important factors that should be 
considered. 
 
Relative power of the paid director 
While one might try to equate activist-paid directors and their pay 
design with CEO nomination and pay, the election of a director and the 
potential pay package she might receive differ greatly from that of a CEO.  
Since the board has several members (on average close to 11), and in most 
 
 186.  Timing of the pay reflects a trade off in the nature of the concern: if payment is 
made in full early on, it might lead to less dependence on the activist in the long term.  That 
said, it might also lead to more incentive for short-termism if the pay is in equity that is not 
restricted.   
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cases the activists aim for a minority slate, even if the activist puts several 
of its nominees on the board, their ability to stir the corporation one way or 
the other is dependent on the approval of the directors that are not paid by 
the activist.  As such, any concern that the payment might lead the director 
to act against shareholders’ long-term benefit is strongly correlated to the 
level of concern shareholders have regarding the board as a whole and the 
relative clout the activist-paid nominees are expected to gain. 
 
The Nominee’s Track Record 
Holding pay design constant, the nominee herself can provide 
important context against which the other factors should be considered.  Is 
the nominee a repeat player with ties to the activist or to other activists?  
Was she nominated by the activist in the past or is likely to prefer the 
activist agenda at all times?  Do the nominee’s resume, track record and 
alternative options justify a supplemental pay arrangement? 
 
Sensitivity to Compensation 
The pay design and pay levels cannot be examined detached from 
each nominee’s sensitivity to such compensation.  Even if the pay design is 
inadequate, the nominee’s current assets might make the payments 
immaterial to her decision-making.  Similarly, the nominee’s desire to 
protect her human capital as a future director and reputation might reduce 
her sensitivity to the pay-incentives in cases where a conflict arises. 
All of the above reflects the plethora of factors that are necessary for 
an informed decision regarding supplemental pay.  While shareholders 
might not wish to delve into each of these factors, it is clear that some key 
factors could help them in classifying a pay package as concerning or not.  
An all-cash pay that is given in installments should raise red flags.  Lack of 
disclosure should raise red flags.  Tying the pay to the activist performance 
and not the company should raise red flags.  A nominee that does not 
provide a unique skill set but is compensated should raise a red flag.  
Alternatively, a commitment from the activist to hold shares as long as his 
candidates are on the board should alleviate concerns.  A pay package that 
is crafted to detach the nominee from the activist performance and is 
geared to incentivize long-term performance should do the same.  A 
nominee with a unique skill set and with strong reputation could also 
contribute to such designation. 
While the interaction between all three legs will not always produce a 
bright line answer, the ability to identify those gray cases would allow 
shareholders to focus their efforts and time on the right cases without the 
need to overreact to what could be a positive development, one that surely 
does not merit the current hysteria surrounding it. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Do activist-paid directors pose a grave concern to the corporate 
governance of public companies?  In several recent cases activist hedge 
funds have attempted, and in one case succeeded, to place an activist-paid 
director on the target’s board.  These attempts have spurred a strong 
backlash from companies, practitioners and academics cautioning against 
the great dangers this emerging practice entails.  Lack of independence, 
erosion of cohesiveness and concern regarding short-termism have all been 
enlisted in the fight against these pay arrangements.  Investors are 
continuously cautioned that the emergence of activist-paid directors is a 
drastic move that shakes the current confines of board best practices. 
This Article strives to burst this rosy bubble regarding board of 
directors’ structure and independence that is painted by those advocating 
against supplemental pay.  Specifically, this Article argues that current 
boards have already been suffering from many of the issues that those 
opposing supplemental pay are invoking, that activist-paid directors are not 
expected to change such landscape dramatically, and that given the benefits 
supplemental pay presents to shareholders and boards themselves, this 
categorical opposition to supplemental pay is unmerited.  Instead of an 
unfounded hysteria over these pay structures, this Article suggests that a 
more nuanced approach is warranted, an approach that balances between 
the benefits these marquee directors could provide on the one hand and the 
valid concerns some pay arrangements might present on the other.  In doing 
so, this Article presents key factors each board and shareholder base should 
evaluate when an activist hedge fund seeks to appoint a director with a 
supplemental pay arrangement. 
 
